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Message-ID: <87y4wc4aff.fsf@sejong.aot.lge.com>
Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2014 14:05:56 +0900
From: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...il.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC net-next 08/14] bpf: add eBPF verifier
Mostly questions and few nitpicks.. :)
On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 17:06:00 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> +/* types of values:
> + * - stored in an eBPF register
> + * - passed into helper functions as an argument
> + * - returned from helper functions
> + */
> +enum bpf_reg_type {
> + INVALID_PTR, /* reg doesn't contain a valid pointer */
I don't think it's a good name. The INVALID_PTR can be read as it
contains a "pointer" which is invalid. Maybe INTEGER, NUMBER or
something different can be used. And I think the struct reg_state->ptr
should be renamed also.
> + PTR_TO_CTX, /* reg points to bpf_context */
> + PTR_TO_MAP, /* reg points to map element value */
> + PTR_TO_MAP_CONDITIONAL, /* points to map element value or NULL */
> + PTR_TO_STACK, /* reg == frame_pointer */
> + PTR_TO_STACK_IMM, /* reg == frame_pointer + imm */
> + PTR_TO_STACK_IMM_MAP_KEY, /* pointer to stack used as map key */
> + PTR_TO_STACK_IMM_MAP_VALUE, /* pointer to stack used as map elem */
So, these PTR_TO_STACK_IMM[_*] types are only for function argument,
right? I guessed it could be used to access memory in general too, but
then I thought it'd make verification complicated..
And I also agree that it'd better splitting reg types and function
argument constraints.
> + RET_INTEGER, /* function returns integer */
> + RET_VOID, /* function returns void */
> + CONST_ARG, /* function expects integer constant argument */
> + CONST_ARG_MAP_ID, /* int const argument that is used as map_id */
That means a map id should always be a constant (for verification), right?
> + /* int const argument indicating number of bytes accessed from stack
> + * previous function argument must be ptr_to_stack_imm
> + */
> + CONST_ARG_STACK_IMM_SIZE,
> +};
[SNIP]
> +
> +/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_table_lookup() */
> +static int check_table_access(struct verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
> + int size)
I guess the "table" is an old name of the "map"?
> +{
> + struct bpf_map *map;
> + int map_id = env->cur_state.regs[regno].imm;
> +
> + _(get_map_info(env, map_id, &map));
> +
> + if (off < 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
> + verbose("invalid access to map_id=%d leaf_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
> + map_id, map->value_size, off, size);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
[SNIP]
> +static int check_mem_access(struct verifier_env *env, int regno, int off,
> + int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
> + int value_regno)
> +{
> + struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
> + int size;
> +
> + _(size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size));
> +
> + if (off % size != 0) {
> + verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", off, size);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> + if (state->regs[regno].ptr == PTR_TO_MAP) {
> + _(check_table_access(env, regno, off, size));
> + if (t == BPF_READ)
> + mark_reg_no_ptr(state->regs, value_regno);
> + } else if (state->regs[regno].ptr == PTR_TO_CTX) {
> + _(check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t));
> + if (t == BPF_READ)
> + mark_reg_no_ptr(state->regs, value_regno);
> + } else if (state->regs[regno].ptr == PTR_TO_STACK) {
> + if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
> + verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
So memory (stack) access is only allowed for a stack base regsiter and a
constant offset, right?
> + if (t == BPF_WRITE)
> + _(check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno));
> + else
> + _(check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno));
> + } else {
> + verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
> + regno, reg_type_str[state->regs[regno].ptr]);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
[SNIP]
> +static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id)
> +{
> + struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
> + const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
> + struct reg_state *regs = state->regs;
> + struct bpf_map *map = NULL;
> + struct reg_state *reg;
> + int map_id = -1;
> + int i;
> +
> + /* find function prototype */
> + if (func_id <= 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
> + verbose("invalid func %d\n", func_id);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (env->prog->info->ops->get_func_proto)
> + fn = env->prog->info->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
> +
> + if (!fn || (fn->ret_type != RET_INTEGER &&
> + fn->ret_type != PTR_TO_MAP_CONDITIONAL &&
> + fn->ret_type != RET_VOID)) {
> + verbose("unknown func %d\n", func_id);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* check args */
> + _(check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &map_id, &map));
> + _(check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &map_id, &map));
> + _(check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &map_id, &map));
> + _(check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &map_id, &map));
Missing BPF_REG_5?
> +
> + /* reset caller saved regs */
> + for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
> + reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
> + reg->read_ok = false;
> + reg->ptr = INVALID_PTR;
> + reg->imm = 0xbadbad;
> + }
> +
> + /* update return register */
> + reg = regs + BPF_REG_0;
> + if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
> + reg->read_ok = true;
> + reg->ptr = INVALID_PTR;
> + } else if (fn->ret_type != RET_VOID) {
> + reg->read_ok = true;
> + reg->ptr = fn->ret_type;
> + if (fn->ret_type == PTR_TO_MAP_CONDITIONAL)
> + /*
> + * remember map_id, so that check_table_access()
> + * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
> + * to map element returned from bpf_table_lookup()
> + */
> + reg->imm = map_id;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
[SNIP]
> +#define PEAK_INT() \
s/PEAK/PEEK/ ?
Thanks,
Namhyung
> + ({ \
> + int _ret; \
> + if (cur_stack == 0) \
> + _ret = -1; \
> + else \
> + _ret = stack[cur_stack - 1]; \
> + _ret; \
> + })
> +
> +#define POP_INT() \
> + ({ \
> + int _ret; \
> + if (cur_stack == 0) \
> + _ret = -1; \
> + else \
> + _ret = stack[--cur_stack]; \
> + _ret; \
> + })
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