Message-ID: <53C9A7B8.1020504@redhat.com>
Date:	Sat, 19 Jul 2014 01:03:20 +0200
From:	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
To:	Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
CC:	davem@...emloft.net, jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions

On 07/19/2014 12:13 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 07/18/2014 11:59 PM, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>> On 07/18/2014 03:17 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>> On 07/18/2014 04:38 PM, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>> ...
>>>> Why is the original value of asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0?
>>>> In case of collision, asoc is the old association that
>>>> existed on the system.  That association was created as part of
>>>> sending the INIT.  If it is processing a duplicate COOKIE-ECHO
>>>> as you say, then it has already processed the INIT-ACK and
>>>> should have determined that the peer is auth capable.
>>>>
>>>> Thus the capability of the new and the old associations should
>>>> be same if we are in fact processing case B (collision).

What I can see is the following that leads to this situation:

1) asoc A sends the INIT, goes from CLOSED into COOKIE_WAIT
2) asoc B receives it, calls into sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() where it
    actually creates asoc B, responds with INIT_ACK, goes from CLOSED
    into COOKIE_WAIT
3) asoc A receives INIT, thus collision, calls into sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit()
3.1) asoc A calls into sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), creates a temp asoc,
      does sctp_process_init() on the temp asoc (auth_cap=1, random etc set),
      replies w/ temp asoc with INIT_ACK
4) asoc B gets INIT_ACK, calls sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack (and thus SCTP_PEER_INIT
    via interpreter), sees auth_cap=1, stores random etc; asoc B transitions
    from COOKIE_WAIT into COOKIE_ECHOED
5) asoc A calls into sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(), does the tietag compare,
    finds action B, creates temp asoc calls sctp_process_init() on it
    sees auth_cap=1, random etc; then we call into sctp_assoc_update()
    and migrate all params; what I see there is that random, chunks, hmac
    migrate from NULL each to the new values stored in the temp asoc
    (and thus we'd need auth_cap as well to be correct); after that, I
    see that asoc A goes from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED (which seems
    to be in accordance to the RFC: "The endpoint should stay in or enter
    the ESTABLISHED state but it MUST ...")
6) later on, asoc B goes from COOKIE_ECHOED into ESTABLISHED

So that led me to the resolution of transferring 'caps' over via
sctp_assoc_update(). In that case, asoc A transitions from 0 -> 1
as previous 'caps' haven't been stored in the actual asoc. It stayed
so far always in a temp asoc that we threw away after a reply.

>>>> If not, then something else if wrong and my guess is that all
>>>> other capabilities would be wrong too.
>>>
>>> I agree that they might likely also be flawed.
>>>
>>> Ok, let me dig further.
>>
>> So I think I know why case D ends up not authenticating the COOKIE-ACK.
>> Most likely the reason is the following statement:
>>   repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
>>
>> Note that we use new_asoc, instead of current asoc.
>
> Thanks, I will give it a try.
>
> Btw, noticed also that when we have AUTH + COOKIE_ECHO collisions,
> we don't seem to handle them properly either. The normal case works
> fine, but in case of a collision both sides seem to use wrong RANDOM
> etc params, and thus discard the handshake due to bad signature.
>
>> Not sure why case B is dumping core yet.
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