netdev - Re: [PATCH RFC v2 net-next 07/16] bpf: add lookup/update/delete/iterate methods to BPF maps

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKA9gArKaqODsD0kswmP0Q77w152VXhq9zCS4pgTZf+Jg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 23 Jul 2014 13:25:16 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc:	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
	Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 net-next 07/16] bpf: add lookup/update/delete/iterate
 methods to BPF maps

On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 12:49 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 11:25 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>> +
>>> +       /* lookup key in a given map referenced by map_id
>>> +        * err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(int map_id, void *key, void *value)
>>
>> This needs map_id documentation updates too?
>
> yes. will grep for it just to make sure.
>
>>> +static int get_map_id(struct fd f)
>>> +{
>>> +       struct bpf_map *map;
>>> +
>>> +       if (!f.file)
>>> +               return -EBADF;
>>> +
>>> +       if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_map_fops) {
>>> +               fdput(f);
>>
>> It feels weird to me to do the fdput inside this function. Instead,
>> should map_lookup_elem get a "err_put" label, instead?
>
> I don't think it will work, since I'm not sure that fd.flags will be zero
> when fd.file == NULL. It looks so by analyzing return code path
> in fs/file.c, but I wasn't sure that I followed all code paths,
> so I just picked this style from fs/timerfd.c assuming it was
> done this away on purpose and there can be the case where
> fd.file == null and fd.flags !=0. In such case we cannot call fdput().

Yeah, hm, looking around, this does seem to be the case. I guess the
thought is that when get_map_id fails, struct fd has been handled.
Maybe add a comment above that function as a reminder?

>>> +       err = -EFAULT;
>>> +       if (copy_to_user(uvalue, value, map->value_size) != 0)
>>> +               goto free_key;
>>
>> I'm made uncomfortable with memory copying where explicit lengths from
>> userspace aren't being used. It does look like it would be redundant,
>> though. Are there other syscalls where the kernel may stomp on user
>> memory based on internal kernel sizes? I think this is fine as-is, but
>> it makes me want to think harder about it. :)
>
> good question :)
> key_size and value_size are passed initially from user space.
> Kernel only verifies and allocates internal map elements with given
> sizes. Then it copies the value back with the size it remembered.
> If user space said at map creation time that value_size is 100,
> it should be using it consistently in user space program.

Yeah, I think this should be fine as-is.

>
>>> +       err = -ENOMEM;
>>> +       next_key = kmalloc(map->key_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
>>
>> In the interests of defensiveness, I'd use kzalloc here.
>
> I think it would be an overkill. Map implementation must consume
> all bytes of incoming 'key' and return exactly the same number
> of bytes in 'next_key'. Otherwise the whole iteration over map
> with 'get_next_key' won't work. So if map implementation is
> broken, it will be seen right away. No security leak here :)

Okay, fair enough. I had a few similar suggestions later. I kind of
wish there was a kcalloc that didn't zero memory to handle the case of
multiplied size input, but no need to spend the time clearing.

>
>>> +       case BPF_MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY:
>>> +               return map_get_next_key((int) arg2, (void __user *) arg3,
>>> +                                       (void __user *) arg4);
>>
>> Same observation as the other syscall cmd: perhaps arg5 == 0 should be
>> checked? Also, since each of these functions looks up the fd and
>
> yes. will do.
>
>> builds the key, maybe those should be added to a common helper instead
>> of copy/pasting into each demuxed function?
>
> well, get_map_id() is a common helper. I didn't move fdget() all
> the way to switch statement, since it looks less readable.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html