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Message-ID: <r3nvbqajovk.fsf@perdido.sfo.corp.google.com>
Date: Sat, 02 Aug 2014 19:19:59 -0700
From: Peter Moody <pmoody@...gle.com>
To: Alex Elsayed <eternaleye@...il.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] RFC, aiding pid/network correlation
On Sat, Aug 02 2014 at 18:49, Alex Elsayed wrote:
> Well, the simple answer is "define a policy that allows everything except
> network operations, and denies those" - this is reasonably simple if you use
> ACL groups because you can set the 'default policy' with acl group 0.
I'm not understanding. I don't want to deny network operations, I just
want to be able to associate the operation with the 'offending' process.
> Yeah, there are flavors of Tomoyo (out-of-tree) that can be stacked, and
> there's the ongoing effort from Casey Schaufler to enable stacking more
> generally.
Yeah, Casey was the one who suggested that I re-write this as an LSM. I
think he saw the monitoring that I'm trying to do (as opposed to
standard LSM deny/permit) as a good candidate for stacking.
> CaitSith is rather different, in that rather than having domain be the
> primary key things operate off of, the action is the central piece. So while
> Tomoyo's policy syntax is
>
> DOMAIN
> POLICY ACTION CONDITION
>
> CaitSith's is
>
> ACTION [QUALIFIER]
> PRIORITY POLICY CONDITION [CONDITION...]
Interesting. It sounds like it's still primary designed to deny/permit
actions (based on some policy) and I'm really just looking to monitor.
Cheers,
peter
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