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Date:	Mon, 08 Sep 2014 10:11:46 +0200
From:	Nicolas Dichtel <>
To:	Eric Dumazet <>,
	David Miller <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] ipv6: refresh rt6i_genid in ip6_pol_route()

Le 08/09/2014 07:07, Eric Dumazet a écrit :
> On Sun, 2014-09-07 at 21:59 -0700, David Miller wrote:
>> From: Eric Dumazet <>
>> Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2014 21:43:54 -0700
>>> On Sun, 2014-09-07 at 21:27 -0700, David Miller wrote:
>>>> From: Eric Dumazet <>
>>>> Date: Sun, 07 Sep 2014 21:18:25 -0700
>>>>> On Sun, 2014-09-07 at 15:54 -0700, David Miller wrote:
>>>>>> This might be broken.
>>>>>> We are dealing here with persistent entries in the ipv6 routine trie.
>>>>>> If you just bump the genid on the next person to look it up, other
>>>>>> sockets and cached entities might not have validated the route yet,
>>>>>> and now will falsely see the route as valid.  We have to ensure that
>>>>>> they too drop this route and perform a relookup.
>>>>> I am confused, I thought it was the role of the cookie.
>>>>> (Ie socket has to store its own cookie to be able to validate a route)
>>>>> Before 6f3118b571b8 patch, how was this done anyway ?
>>>>> If persistent routes cannot refresh the genid, then they are useless ?
>>>> I just speak about the genid aspect.
>>>> I understand that cookie (via node->fn_sernum) invalidates the path
>>>> in the fib_trie, but the genid protects against other circumstances
>>>> (matching IPSEC rule, f.e.)
>>>> You have to make sure all other sockets did a full route lookup
>>>> (including IPSEC) before you can safely adjust the genid.
>>>> I could be wrong, recheck my analysis please :-)
>>> So this whole genid protection can not work, unless we make sure a
>>> socket cannot share a route with another socket.
>>> This means we have to clone all routes.
>> I'm willing to revert the change in question if you think that's the
>> sanest way forward.
>> The bug fix for more obscure use cases (IPSEC) if pointless if it
>> breaks more common things (TCP input route caching).
> Lets wait for Nicolas and/or Hannes input, they might have some ideas...

The initial problem was in SCTP. Here is the thread after the v1 patch:

Before the patch, SCTP stored the IPv6 route in its cache and if an IPsec
rules was inserted after that operation, SCTP never invalidated the cached
route to use a new xfrm route.
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