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Date:	Wed, 17 Sep 2014 08:51:18 +0200
From:	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
To:	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
CC:	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
	Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 net-next 07/11] bpf: verifier (add ability to receive
 verification log)

On 09/17/2014 02:39 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall:
> union bpf_attr {
>      struct {
> 	...
> 	__u32         log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */
> 	__u32         log_size;  /* size of user buffer */
> 	__aligned_u64 log_buf;   /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */
>      };
> };
>
> when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user
> supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why
> verifier rejected given program.
>
> 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt
> provides several examples of these messages, like the program:
>
>    BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
>    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
>    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
>    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
>    BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
>    BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
>    BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0),
>    BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
>
> will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf:
>
>    0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
>    1: (bf) r2 = r10
>    2: (07) r2 += -8
>    3: (b7) r1 = 0
>    4: (85) call 1
>    5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
>     R0=map_ptr R10=fp
>    6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0
>    misaligned access off 4 size 8
>
> The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
> ---
>   include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |    3 +
>   kernel/bpf/syscall.c     |    2 +-
>   kernel/bpf/verifier.c    |  235 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   3 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index 424f442016e7..31b0ac208a52 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ union bpf_attr {
>   		__u32		insn_cnt;
>   		__aligned_u64	insns;
>   		__aligned_u64	license;
> +		__u32		log_level;	/* verbosity level of verifier */
> +		__u32		log_size;	/* size of user buffer */
> +		__aligned_u64	log_buf;	/* user supplied buffer */
>   	};
>   } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 67b5e29f183e..c7be7163bd11 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
>   }
>
>   /* last field in 'union bpf_attr' used by this command */
> -#define	BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD license
> +#define	BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD log_buf

I was looking to find a use case for this item, but couldn't find anything, so
this seems to be dead code?

Was it, so that each time you extend an uapi structure like above that you would
only access the structure up to BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD? That might not work for
old binaries using this ABI running on newer kernels where there are different
expectations of what BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD has been at the time of compilation.

>   static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
>   {
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index d6f9c3d6b4d7..871edc1f2e1f 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -125,9 +125,244 @@
>    * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
>    */
>
> +/* single container for all structs
> + * one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
> + */
> +struct verifier_env {
> +};
> +
> +/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
> + * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
> + */
> +static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
> +static char *log_buf;
> +
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
> +
> +/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
> + * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
> + * can figure out what's wrong with the program
> + */
> +static void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
> +{
> +	va_list args;
> +
> +	if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
> +		return;
> +
> +	va_start(args, fmt);
> +	log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
> +	va_end(args);
> +}
> +
> +static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
> +	[BPF_LD]    = "ld",
> +	[BPF_LDX]   = "ldx",
> +	[BPF_ST]    = "st",
> +	[BPF_STX]   = "stx",
> +	[BPF_ALU]   = "alu",
> +	[BPF_JMP]   = "jmp",
> +	[BPF_RET]   = "BUG",
> +	[BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
> +};
> +
> +static const char *const bpf_alu_string[] = {
> +	[BPF_ADD >> 4]  = "+=",
> +	[BPF_SUB >> 4]  = "-=",
> +	[BPF_MUL >> 4]  = "*=",
> +	[BPF_DIV >> 4]  = "/=",
> +	[BPF_OR  >> 4]  = "|=",
> +	[BPF_AND >> 4]  = "&=",
> +	[BPF_LSH >> 4]  = "<<=",
> +	[BPF_RSH >> 4]  = ">>=",
> +	[BPF_NEG >> 4]  = "neg",
> +	[BPF_MOD >> 4]  = "%=",
> +	[BPF_XOR >> 4]  = "^=",
> +	[BPF_MOV >> 4]  = "=",
> +	[BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
> +	[BPF_END >> 4]  = "endian",
> +};
> +
> +static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
> +	[BPF_W >> 3]  = "u32",
> +	[BPF_H >> 3]  = "u16",
> +	[BPF_B >> 3]  = "u8",
> +	[BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
> +};
> +
> +static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[] = {
> +	[BPF_JA >> 4]   = "jmp",
> +	[BPF_JEQ >> 4]  = "==",
> +	[BPF_JGT >> 4]  = ">",
> +	[BPF_JGE >> 4]  = ">=",
> +	[BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
> +	[BPF_JNE >> 4]  = "!=",
> +	[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
> +	[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
> +	[BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
> +	[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
> +};
> +
> +static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
> +{
> +	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
> +
> +	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
> +		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
> +			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
> +				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
> +				insn->dst_reg,
> +				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
> +				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
> +				insn->src_reg);
> +		else
> +			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
> +				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
> +				insn->dst_reg,
> +				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
> +				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
> +				insn->imm);
> +	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
> +		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
> +			verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
> +				insn->code,
> +				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +				insn->dst_reg,
> +				insn->off, insn->src_reg);
> +		else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
> +			verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
> +				insn->code,
> +				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +				insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
> +				insn->src_reg);
> +		else
> +			verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
> +	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
> +		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
> +			verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
> +			return;
> +		}
> +		verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
> +			insn->code,
> +			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +			insn->dst_reg,
> +			insn->off, insn->imm);
> +	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
> +		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
> +			verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
> +			return;
> +		}
> +		verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
> +			insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
> +			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +			insn->src_reg, insn->off);
> +	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
> +		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
> +				insn->code,
> +				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +				insn->imm);
> +		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
> +				insn->code,
> +				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
> +				insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
> +		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
> +				insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
> +		} else {
> +			verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
> +			return;
> +		}
> +	} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
> +		u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
> +
> +		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) call %d\n", insn->code, insn->imm);
> +		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
> +				insn->code, insn->off);
> +		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
> +		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
> +			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
> +				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
> +				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
> +				insn->src_reg, insn->off);
> +		} else {
> +			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
> +				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
> +				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
> +				insn->imm, insn->off);
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
>   {
> +	char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
> +	struct verifier_env *env;
>   	int ret = -EINVAL;
>
> +	if (prog->len <= 0 || prog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
> +		return -E2BIG;
> +
> +	/* 'struct verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
> +	 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
> +	 */
> +	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!env)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
> +	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);

So only because of the verifier error log (which are global vars here) we
now have to hold a eBPF-related mutex lock each time when attaching a program?

Also, if you really have to do the verifier error log, can't we spare ourself
most part of the textifying parts if you would encode the verifier log into a
normal structure array with eBPF specific error codes and then do all this
pretty printing in user space? Why is that impossible? I really think it's odd.

> +	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
> +		/* user requested verbose verifier output
> +		 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
> +		 */
> +		log_level = attr->log_level;
> +		log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
> +		log_size = attr->log_size;
> +		log_len = 0;
> +
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		/* log_* values have to be sane */
> +		if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
> +		    log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
> +			goto free_env;
> +
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
> +		if (!log_buf)
> +			goto free_env;
> +	} else {
> +		log_level = 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* ret = do_check(env); */
> +
> +	if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
> +		BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
> +		/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
> +		ret = -ENOSPC;
> +		/* fall through to return what was recorded */
> +	}
> +
> +	/* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
> +	if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
> +		ret = -EFAULT;
> +		goto free_log_buf;
> +	}
> +
> +
> +free_log_buf:
> +	if (log_level)
> +		vfree(log_buf);
> +free_env:
> +	kfree(env);
> +	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
>   	return ret;
>   }
>
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