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Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 00:06:13 +0200
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
To: Joshua Kinard <kumba@...too.org>
CC: davem@...emloft.net, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 1/3] net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving
malformed ASCONF chunks
On 10/10/2014 12:04 PM, Joshua Kinard wrote:
...
> If I am reading correctly, this crash can only be triggered by actually getting
> through the SCTP handshake, then sending this specially-crafted ASCONF chunk?
> Meaning a blind nmap scan using this tactic against a random netblock wouldn't
> just randomly knock servers offline? This would seem to reduce the attack
> surface a quite bit by requiring the remote endpoint to actually respond.
Sorry, have been on travel almost whole day ... yes, handshake has to be
completed before that. So a scan/probe would need to establish a connection
first and ASCONF would need to be supported.
> Is there a CVE # for this?
CVE-2014-3673
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