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Message-ID: <1416536527.8629.74.camel@edumazet-glaptop2.roam.corp.google.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 18:22:07 -0800
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, kernel-team@...com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tcp: Restore RFC5961-compliant behavior for SYN packets
On Thu, 2014-11-20 at 17:47 -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> That's actually not what led to finding this, but it's a good point. :)
>
> What if the challenge-ACK counter were decremented in tcp_validate_incoming()
> when a valid RST packet is seen? That would allow legitimate remote
> hosts to reestablish connections without being ratelimited, and still
> prevent a malicious host from guessing sequence numbers.
>
> There would need to be a way to tell if a challenge ACK had in fact been
> sent and only decrement in that case, since otherwise a local attacker
> could establish and immediately reset lots of connections to keep the
> counter below the ratelimit threshold and guess sequence numbers.
>
> Simply adding a flag to struct tcp_sock would work: just set the flag
> whenever a challenge ACK is sent, and clear it and decrement the counter
> only if it is set when a valid RST packet is seen.
Seems tricky, a Challenge ACK do not necessarily gives an RST.
Anyway this certainly can wait, as we already have a sysctl to
eventually work around the issue.
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Thanks !
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