| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 17:15:19 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] Revert "selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook"
This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169.
No longer needed after commit eb8895debe1baba41fcb62c78a16f0c63c21662a
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")
When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_alloc
Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 8 --------
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 -
security/capability.c | 6 ------
security/security.c | 5 -----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 -------
5 files changed, 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a1b7dbd127ff..25a079a7c3b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1716,7 +1716,6 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*tun_dev_attach_queue) (void *security);
int (*tun_dev_attach) (struct sock *sk, void *security);
int (*tun_dev_open) (void *security);
- void (*skb_owned_by) (struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2735,8 +2734,6 @@ int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security);
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security);
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security);
-void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk);
-
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
@@ -2928,11 +2925,6 @@ static inline int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
{
return 0;
}
-
-static inline void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
-{
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index c2f0f6065cb1..18474088c3d0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2926,7 +2926,6 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
skb_reserve(skb, MAX_TCP_HEADER);
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
- security_skb_owned_by(skb, sk);
mss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tp->rx_opt.user_mss && tp->rx_opt.user_mss < mss)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 070dd46f62f4..58a1600c149b 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -776,11 +776,6 @@ static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security)
{
return 0;
}
-
-static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
-{
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1134,7 +1129,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, skb_owned_by);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e81d5bbe7363..1f475aa53288 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1359,11 +1359,6 @@ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
-void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
-{
- security_ops->skb_owned_by(skb, sk);
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4d1a54190388..edc66de39f2e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
-#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -4652,11 +4651,6 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
-static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
-{
- skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
-}
-
static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
@@ -6041,7 +6035,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
.tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
.tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
- .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
--
2.2.0.rc0.207.ga3a616c
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists