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Message-Id: <20150322.195003.654000183854114521.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 19:50:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: herbert@...dor.apana.org.au
Cc: eric.dumazet@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
roland@...estorage.com
Subject: Re: arp_hash
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 10:08:48 +1100
> On Sun, Mar 22, 2015 at 06:58:50PM -0400, David Miller wrote:
>>
>> But I do not agree with the idea that it is in any way possible to
>> stop someone with root access on the physical network from crudding up
>> our ARP hash tables.
>
> But you don't need root access to exploit the neighbour hash
> table. You just need a sufficiently large (e.g., /16) route
> to a network and anybody on the system can then generate traffic
> to it.
>
> Granted these days hardly anybody on IPv4 would have such a route
> but if you do then the hash table makes you exposed.
>
> And for IPv6 everybody is potentially exposed.
BTW I asked for feedback when I posted the patches which created this
situation, and the multiply with the random input was believed to have
sufficient entropy and not create a situation any worse,
asymptotically, than what we had beforehand.
Perhaps the ipv6 case can be improved, by using a u32 random input
for each u32 of the address being hashed.
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