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Message-ID: <1427272141.10689.7.camel@takeit.se>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:29:01 +0100
From: "D. S. Ljungmark" <spider@...eit.se>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
From 3ae93eb68a06ab2d9c984c6708dbc9e5f3bc8251 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "D.S. Ljungmark" <ljungmark@...io.se>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:28:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@...io.se>
---
net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
index 471ed24..14ecdaf 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,14 @@ static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rt)
rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime));
if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
- in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
+ /* Only set hop_limit on the interface if it is higher than
+ * the current hop_limit.
+ */
+ if (in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit < ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+ in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
+ } else {
+ ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than current\n");
+ }
if (rt)
dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
--
2.1.0
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