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Message-ID: <20150423114533.GI8928@secunet.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2015 13:45:34 +0200
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
CC: <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Paul Wouters <pwouters@...hat.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: CCM/GCM implementation defect
On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 11:26:20AM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> Hi:
>
> It looks like our IPsec implementations of CCM and GCM are buggy
> in that they don't include the IV in the authentication calculation.
Seems like crypto_rfc4106_crypt() passes the associated data it
got from ESP directly to gcm, without chaining with the IV.
>
> This definitely breaks interoperability with anyone who implements
> them correctly. The fact that there have been no reports on this
> probably means that nobody has run into this in the field yet.
>
> On the security side, this is probably not a big deal for CCM
> because it always verifies the authentication tag after decryption.
> But for GCM this may be a DoS issue as an attacker could modify
> the IV without triggering the authentication check and thus cause
> an unnecessary decryption. For both CCM and GCM this will result
> in random data injected as a packet into the network stack which
> hopefully will be dropped.
>
> In order to fix this without breaking backwards compatibility,
> my plan is to introduce new templates such as rfc4106v2 which
> implement the RFC correctly. The existing templates will be
> retained so that current users aren't broken by the fix.
Adding a second template for the correct implementation is
probaply the only thing that we can do if we don't want to
break backwards compatibility. But maybe we can add a warning
to the old implementation, such that users notice that they
use a broken version.
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