Message-ID: <5555F257.3030906@redhat.com>
Date:	Fri, 15 May 2015 09:19:19 -0400
From:	Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>
To:	Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>,
	Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>
CC:	linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-audit@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	eparis@...isplace.org, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] audit: log creation and deletion of namespace
 instances



On 05/14/2015 10:11 PM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 15/05/14, Oren Laadan wrote:
>> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 8:48 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>>>>>> Recording each instance of a name space is giving me something that I
>>>>>> cannot use to do queries required by the security target. Given these
>>>>>> events, how do I locate a web server event where it accesses a
>>> watched
>>>>>> file? That authentication failed? That an update within the container
>>>>>> failed?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The requirements are that we have to log the creation, suspension,
>>>>>> migration, and termination of a container. The requirements are not
>>> on
>>>>>> the individual name space.
>>>>> Ok.  Do we have a robust definition of a container?
>>>> We call the combination of name spaces, cgroups, and seccomp rules a
>>>> container.
>>> Can you detail what information is required from each?
>>>
>>>>> Where is that definition managed?
>>>> In the thing that invokes a container.
>>> I was looking for a reference to a standards document rather than an
>>> application...
>>>
>>>
>> [focusing on "containers id" - snipped the rest away]
>>
>> I am unfamiliar with the audit subsystem, but work with namespaces in other
>> contexts. Perhaps the term "container" is overloaded here. The definition
>> suggested by Steve in this thread makes sense to me: "a combination of
>> namespaces". I imagine people may want to audit subsets of namespaces.
> I assume it would be a bit more than that, including cgroup and seccomp info.
I don't see why seccomp versus other Security mechanism come into this. 
Not really
sure of cgroup.  That stuff would all be associated with the process.  I
would guess
you could look at the process that modified these for logging, but that
should happen
at the time they get changed,  Not recorded for every process.
>> For namespaces, can use a string like "A:B:C:D:E:F" as an identifier for a
>> particular combination, where A-F are respective namespaces identifiers.
>> (Can be taken for example from /proc/PID/ns/{mnt,uts,ipc,user,pid,net}).
>>  That will even be grep-able to locate records related to a particular
>> subset
>> of namespaces. So a "container" in the classic meaning would have all A-F
>> unique and different from the init process, but processes separated only by
>> e.g. mnt-ns and net-ns will differ from the init process in  A and F.
>>
>> (If a string is a no go, then perhaps combine the IDs in a unique way into a
>> super ID).
> I'd be fine with either, even including the nsfs deviceID.
>
>> Oren.
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@...hat.com>
> Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
> Remote, Ottawa, Canada
> Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@...hat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

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