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Message-ID: <1435681257.4110.126.camel@edumazet-glaptop2.roam.corp.google.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 18:20:57 +0200
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Craig Gallek <kraig@...gle.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@...emonkey.org.uk>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: 4.1+ use after free in netlink_broadcast_filtered
On Tue, 2015-06-30 at 11:28 -0400, Craig Gallek wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 4:26 PM, Craig Gallek <kraig@...gle.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 10:33 AM, Craig Gallek <kraig@...gle.com> wrote:
> >> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 1:17 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
> >>> On Fri, 2015-06-26 at 00:44 -0400, Dave Jones wrote:
> >>>> I taught Trinity about NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID and NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS
> >>>> yesterday, and this evening, this fell out..
> >>>>
> >>>> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
> >>>> CPU: 1 PID: 9130 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.1.0-gelk-debug+ #1
> >>>> Workqueue: sock_diag_events sock_diag_broadcast_destroy_work
> >>>> task: ffff8800b94e4c40 ti: ffff8800352ec000 task.ti: ffff8800352ec000
> >>>> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff845c82e4>] [<ffffffff845c82e4>] netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x24/0x3b0
> >>>> RSP: 0000:ffff8800352efd08 EFLAGS: 00010292
> >>>> RAX: ffff8800ab903d80 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000003
> >>>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: ffff8800b9c586c0
> >>>> RBP: ffff8800352efd78 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
> >>>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000220 R12: 0000000000000000
> >>>> R13: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
> >>>> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8800bf700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> >>>> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> >>>> CR2: 0000000002121ff8 CR3: 0000000030169000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
> >>>> DR0: 00007fe1f0454000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> >>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
> >>>> Stack:
> >>>> ffff8800b9c586c0 ffff8800b9c586c0 ffff8800ac4692c0 ffff8800936d4a90
> >>>> ffff8800352efd38 ffffffff8469a93e ffff8800352efd98 ffffffffc09b9b90
> >>>> ffff8800352efd78 ffff8800ac4692c0 ffff8800b9c586c0 ffff8800831b6ab8
> >>>> Call Trace:
> >>>> [<ffffffff8469a93e>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
> >>>> [<ffffffffc09b9b90>] ? inet_diag_handler_get_info+0x110/0x1fb [inet_diag]
> >>>> [<ffffffff845c868d>] netlink_broadcast+0x1d/0x20
> >>>> [<ffffffff8469a93e>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
> >>>> [<ffffffff845b2bf5>] sock_diag_broadcast_destroy_work+0xd5/0x160
> >>>> [<ffffffff8408ea97>] process_one_work+0x147/0x420
> >>>> [<ffffffff8408f0f9>] worker_thread+0x69/0x470
> >>>> [<ffffffff8409fda3>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xa3/0xf0
> >>>> [<ffffffff8408f090>] ? rescuer_thread+0x320/0x320
> >>>> [<ffffffff84093cd7>] kthread+0x107/0x120
> >>>> [<ffffffff84093bd0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1b0/0x1b0
> >>>> [<ffffffff8469d31f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
> >>>> [<ffffffff84093bd0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1b0/0x1b0
> >>>> Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 48 89 f7 44 89 c6 41 54 41 89 d4 53 89 cb 48 83 ec 48 <49> 8b 45 30 44 89 45 a4 4c 89 4d 98 48 89 45 c0 e8 07 f6 ff ff
> >>>> RIP [<ffffffff845c82e4>] netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x24/0x3b0
> >>>> RSP <ffff8800352efd08>
> >>>> ---[ end trace e2d8a07893775a9e ]---
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> r13 looks like slab poison, and the decoded instruction shows..
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> int netlink_broadcast_filtered(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid,
> >>>> u32 group, gfp_t allocation,
> >>>> int (*filter)(struct sock *dsk, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data),
> >>>> void *filter_data)
> >>>> {
> >>>> 1b70: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 1b75 <netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x5>
> >>>> 1b75: 55 push %rbp
> >>>> 1b76: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp
> >>>> 1b79: 41 57 push %r15
> >>>> 1b7b: 41 56 push %r14
> >>>> 1b7d: 41 55 push %r13
> >>>> 1b7f: 49 89 fd mov %rdi,%r13
> >>>> 1b82: 48 89 f7 mov %rsi,%rdi
> >>>> 1b85: 44 89 c6 mov %r8d,%esi
> >>>> 1b88: 41 54 push %r12
> >>>> 1b8a: 41 89 d4 mov %edx,%r12d
> >>>> 1b8d: 53 push %rbx
> >>>> 1b8e: 89 cb mov %ecx,%ebx
> >>>> 1b90: 48 83 ec 48 sub $0x48,%rsp
> >>>> 1b94: 49 8b 45 30 mov 0x30(%r13),%rax <-- trapping instruction
> >>>> 1b98: 44 89 45 a4 mov %r8d,-0x5c(%rbp)
> >>>> 1b9c: 4c 89 4d 98 mov %r9,-0x68(%rbp)
> >>>> 1ba0: 48 89 45 c0 mov %rax,-0x40(%rbp)
> >>>> struct net *net = sock_net(ssk);
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> So it looks like the ssk we passed in was already freed.
> >>>> I'll dig into this some more next week, and try to find a better
> >>>> reproducer.
> >> Thanks for the pointer. In this stack, I believe ssk should always be
> >> diag_nlsk from the struct net associated with a sock that is being
> >> destroyed. Given that diag_nlsk is created/destroyed via __net_init
> >> and __net_exit and that this broadcast work happens out of band in a
> >> work queue, it seems possible that the destruction of a given
> >> diag_nlsk can race with a socked destruction event.
> >>
> >> I'll try to reproduce it and send a fix as soon as I confirm. I think
> >> a simple fix may be to change the nlmsg_multicast line in
> >> sock_diag_broadcast_destroy_work to use init_net instead of the per
> >> socket namespace.
> >
> > I haven't been able to reproduce this failure yet. Further, I think
> > I've convinced myself that the network namespace reference counting is
> > correct in the sock_diag_broadcast_destroy_work path (the socket being
> > destroyed should hold a reference to the net structure at least until
> > it calls sk_destruct).
> >
> > My new theory is that there was a pre-existing extraneous call to
> > put_net that prematurely destroys the structure. My change to add the
> > broadcast (which relies on the net structure) may have simply exposed
> > it. An additional sanity check in put_net could confirm this theory
> > (with a reliable test case). I'll keep digging...
> I still haven't been able to produce this exact crash, but I think I
> understand what can cause it. The patch below shows a reference count
> of zero when creating/destroying a network namespace.
> ~# ip netns add test-ns
> ~# ip netns delete test-ns
> [ 342.351708] broadcast kernel socket ffff880662f1f2c0 count: 0
>
> The reference counting behavior of network namespaces seems to have
> changed recently in
> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/470239/
> through
> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/470244/
> I'm not exactly sure if this is a coincidence or actually related to
> this issue. Either way, I don't think we care about broadcasting the
> destruction of kernel sockets anyway. I think a reasonable fix would
> be to simply ignore sockets that don't hold a reference to the
> namespace when they are destroyed. I'll prepare a patch which does
> this.
>
Yes, this is definitely the reason, although you probably should use
something like attached patch.
This came with commit 26abe14379f8e2fa3fd1bcf97c9a7ad9364886fe
("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel
sockets.")
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 1e1fe9a68d835983d760d50f9ef6a11309ffcfc1..165230cfa10ea01849ca2b4358e7e6c1e69b83aa 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ void sk_destruct(struct sock *sk)
static void __sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
- if (unlikely(sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk)))
+ if (unlikely(sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk) && sk->sk_net_refcnt))
sock_diag_broadcast_destroy(sk);
else
sk_destruct(sk);
--
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