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Message-ID: <CALCETrVYtv1=g-xPjQ-LiX+5GK3xtB6a2hYbat0TuU-Bd4QA6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2015 09:30:52 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: v2 of seccomp filter c/r patches
On Sep 10, 2015 5:22 PM, "Tycho Andersen" <tycho.andersen@...onical.com> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> Here is v2 of the seccomp filter c/r set. The patch notes have individual
> changes from the last series, but there are two points not noted:
>
> * The series still does not allow us to correctly restore state for programs
> that will use SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC in the future. Given that we want to
> keep seccomp_filter's identity, I think something along the lines of another
> seccomp command like SECCOMP_INHERIT_PARENT is needed (although I'm not sure
> if this can even be done yet). In addition, we'll need a kcmp command for
> figuring out if filters are the same, although this too needs to compare
> seccomp_filter objects, so it's a little screwy. Any thoughts on how to do
> this nicely are welcome.
Let's add a concept of a seccompfd.
For background of what I want to add: I want to be able to create a
seccomp monitor. A seccomp monitor will be, logically, a pair of a
struct file that represents the monitor and a seccomp_filter that is
controlled by the monitor. Depending on flags, whoever holds the
monitor fd could change the active filter, intercept syscalls, and
issue syscalls on behalf of a process that is trapped in an
intercepted syscall.
Seccomp filters would nest properly.
The interface would probably be (extremely pseudocoded):
monitor_fd, filter_fd = seccomp(CREATE_MONITOR, flags, ...);
Then, later:
seccomp(ATTACH_TO_FILTER, filter_fd); /* now filtered */
read(monitor_fd, buf, size); /* returns an intercepted syscall */
write(monitor_fd, buf, size); /* issues a syscall or releases the
trapped task */
This can't be implemented on x86 without either going insane or
finishing the massive set of pending cleanups to the x86 entry code.
I favor the latter.
We could, however, add part of it right now: we could have a way to
create a filterfd, we could add kcmp support for it, and we could add
the ATTACH_TO_FILTER thing. I think that would solve your problem.
One major open question: does a filter_fd know what its parent is and,
if so, will it just refuse to attach if the caller's parent is wrong?
Or will a filter_fd attach anywhere.
--Andy
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