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Message-ID: <1442398145.131189.46.camel@infradead.org>
Date:	Wed, 16 Sep 2015 11:09:05 +0100
From:	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
To:	Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Cc:	netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, johannes@...solutions.net
Subject: Re: IPv6 routing/fragmentation panic

On Wed, 2015-09-16 at 01:48 +0200, Florian Westphal wrote:
> 
> What I don't understand is why you see this with fragmented ipv6 
> packets only (and not with all ipv6 forwarded skbs).
> 
> Something like this copy-pastry from ip_finish_output2 should fix it:

That works; thanks.

Tested-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@...el.com>

A little extra debugging output shows that the offending fragments were
arriving here with skb_headroom(skb)==10. Which is reasonable, being
the Solos ADSL card's header of 8 bytes followed by 2 bytes of PPP
frame type.

The non-fragmented packets, on the other hand, are arriving with a
headroom of 42 bytes. Could something else already have reallocated
them before they get that far? (Do we have any way to gather statistics
on such reallocations? It seems that might be useful for performance
investigation.)

Johannes and I were talking on IRC yesterday about trying to make this
kind of thing easier to reproduce without odd hardware. We postulated a
skb_torture() function which, when an appropriate debugging option was
enabled, would randomly screw around with the skb in various
interesting ways — shifting the data down so that there's no headroom,
deliberately making it *non-linear*, temporarily cloning it and freeing
the clone a couple of seconds later, etc.

Then we could insert calls to skb_torture() in interesting places like
netif_rx(), ip6_finish_output2() and anywhere else that seems
appropriate (perhaps with flags to indicate *what* kind of torture is
permissible in certain locations). And see what breaks...

-- 
David Woodhouse                            Open Source Technology Centre
David.Woodhouse@...el.com                              Intel Corporation


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