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Message-Id: <1444240541-4665-1-git-send-email-ast@plumgrid.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 10:55:41 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 net-next] bpf: fix cb access in socket filter programs
eBPF socket filter programs may see junk in 'u32 cb[5]' area,
since it could have been used by protocol layers earlier.
For socket filter programs used in af_packet we need to clean
20 bytes of skb->cb area if it could be used by the program.
For programs attached to TCP/UDP sockets we need to save/restore
these 20 bytes, since it's used by protocol layers.
Remove SK_RUN_FILTER macro, since it's no longer used.
Long term we may move this bpf cb area to per-cpu scratch, but that
requires addition of new 'per-cpu load/store' instructions,
so not suitable as a short term fix.
Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
---
v1->v2:
dropped extra conditional for clearing of cb for af_packet.
Since eBPF is root only, the impact of the bug is low and
the fix can stay in net-next.
For those interested in assembler code: gcc 4.7 generates
ugly code for this memcpy/memset, but gcc 4.9 looks great.
Thankfuly both move unlikely paths out of the way.
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 6 +++---
include/linux/filter.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
net/core/filter.c | 12 +++++++-----
net/packet/af_packet.c | 10 +++++-----
5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index c915a6b54570..19b8a2081f88 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ enum bpf_access_type {
BPF_WRITE = 2
};
+struct bpf_prog;
+
struct bpf_verifier_ops {
/* return eBPF function prototype for verification */
const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_ops {
u32 (*convert_ctx_access)(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg,
int src_reg, int ctx_off,
- struct bpf_insn *insn);
+ struct bpf_insn *insn, struct bpf_prog *prog);
};
struct bpf_prog_type_list {
@@ -120,8 +122,6 @@ struct bpf_prog_type_list {
enum bpf_prog_type type;
};
-struct bpf_prog;
-
struct bpf_prog_aux {
atomic_t refcnt;
u32 used_map_cnt;
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 1bbce14bcf17..4165e9ac9e36 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <net/sch_generic.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -302,10 +303,6 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux;
bpf_size; \
})
-/* Macro to invoke filter function. */
-#define SK_RUN_FILTER(filter, ctx) \
- (*filter->prog->bpf_func)(ctx, filter->prog->insnsi)
-
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/* A struct sock_filter is architecture independent. */
struct compat_sock_fprog {
@@ -329,6 +326,7 @@ struct bpf_prog {
kmemcheck_bitfield_begin(meta);
u16 jited:1, /* Is our filter JIT'ed? */
gpl_compatible:1, /* Is filter GPL compatible? */
+ cb_access:1, /* Is control block accessed? */
dst_needed:1; /* Do we need dst entry? */
kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta);
u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */
@@ -352,6 +350,39 @@ struct sk_filter {
#define BPF_PROG_RUN(filter, ctx) (*filter->bpf_func)(ctx, filter->insnsi)
+static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_save_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u8 *cb_data = qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->data;
+ u8 saved_cb[QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN];
+ u32 res;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct __sk_buff, cb) !=
+ QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN);
+
+ if (unlikely(prog->cb_access)) {
+ memcpy(saved_cb, cb_data, sizeof(saved_cb));
+ memset(cb_data, 0, sizeof(saved_cb));
+ }
+
+ res = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb);
+
+ if (unlikely(prog->cb_access))
+ memcpy(cb_data, saved_cb, sizeof(saved_cb));
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u8 *cb_data = qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->data;
+
+ if (unlikely(prog->cb_access))
+ memset(cb_data, 0, QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN);
+ return BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb);
+}
+
static inline unsigned int bpf_prog_size(unsigned int proglen)
{
return max(sizeof(struct bpf_prog),
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b074b23000d6..f8da034c2258 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct verifier_env *env)
cnt = env->prog->aux->ops->
convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
- insn->off, insn_buf);
+ insn->off, insn_buf, env->prog);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index da3e5357f138..cbaa23c3fb30 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -56,10 +56,10 @@
* @sk: sock associated with &sk_buff
* @skb: buffer to filter
*
- * Run the filter code and then cut skb->data to correct size returned by
- * SK_RUN_FILTER. If pkt_len is 0 we toss packet. If skb->len is smaller
+ * Run the eBPF program and then cut skb->data to correct size returned by
+ * the program. If pkt_len is 0 we toss packet. If skb->len is smaller
* than pkt_len we keep whole skb->data. This is the socket level
- * wrapper to SK_RUN_FILTER. It returns 0 if the packet should
+ * wrapper to BPF_PROG_RUN. It returns 0 if the packet should
* be accepted or -EPERM if the packet should be tossed.
*
*/
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
rcu_read_lock();
filter = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_filter);
if (filter) {
- unsigned int pkt_len = SK_RUN_FILTER(filter, skb);
+ unsigned int pkt_len = bpf_prog_run_save_cb(filter->prog, skb);
err = pkt_len ? pskb_trim(skb, pkt_len) : -EPERM;
}
@@ -1740,7 +1740,8 @@ static bool tc_cls_act_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
static u32 bpf_net_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg,
int src_reg, int ctx_off,
- struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
+ struct bpf_insn *insn_buf,
+ struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
@@ -1831,6 +1832,7 @@ static u32 bpf_net_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg,
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[4]):
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct qdisc_skb_cb, data) < 20);
+ prog->cb_access = 1;
ctx_off -= offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb[0]);
ctx_off += offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb);
ctx_off += offsetof(struct qdisc_skb_cb, data);
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 81c900fbc4a4..104910f7d1fb 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ static unsigned int fanout_demux_bpf(struct packet_fanout *f,
rcu_read_lock();
prog = rcu_dereference(f->bpf_prog);
if (prog)
- ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb) % num;
+ ret = bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(prog, skb) % num;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
@@ -1939,16 +1939,16 @@ out_free:
return err;
}
-static unsigned int run_filter(const struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct sock *sk,
- unsigned int res)
+static unsigned int run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct sock *sk,
+ unsigned int res)
{
struct sk_filter *filter;
rcu_read_lock();
filter = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_filter);
if (filter != NULL)
- res = SK_RUN_FILTER(filter, skb);
+ res = bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(filter->prog, skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
--
1.7.9.5
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