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Message-ID: <20151008062155.GA18452@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 08:21:55 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs
* Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
> As far as sysctl we can look at two with similar purpose:
> sysctl_perf_event_paranoid and modules_disabled.
> First one is indeed multi level, but not because of the fear of bugs,
> but because of real security implications.
It serves both purposes flexibly, and note that most people and distros will use
the default value.
> [...] Like raw events on hyperthreaded cpu or uncore events can extract data
> from other user processes. So it controls these extra privileges.
It also controls the generally increased risk caused by a larger attack surface,
which some users may not want to carry and which they can thus shrink.
With a static keys approach there would be no runtime overhead worth speaking of,
so I see no reason why unprivileged eBPF couldn't have a sysctl too - with the
default value set to permissive.
Thanks,
Ingo
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