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Message-ID: <20151019203314.GG4386@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 22:33:14 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Ani Sinha <ani@...sta.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>, Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, netfilter@...r.kernel.org,
coreteam@...filter.org,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: linux 3.4.43 : kernel crash at __nf_conntrack_confirm
Ani Sinha <ani@...sta.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de> wrote:
> > Ani Sinha <ani@...sta.com> wrote:
> >> Indeed. So it seems to me that we have run into one another such case.
> >> In patch c6825c0976fa7893692, I see we have added an additional check (along with comparing tuple and zone) to verify that if the conntrack is confirmed.
> >>
> >> + return nf_ct_tuple_equal(tuple, &h->tuple) &&
> >> + nf_ct_zone(ct) == zone &&
> >> + nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct);
> >>
> >> This is necessary since it's possible that a conntrack can be recreated with the same zone.
> >> Unfortunately, we leave a hole open in __nf_conntrack_confirm() because this routine _is_ responsible
> >> for confirming the conntrack. We cannot use the same logic here.
> >
> > Hmm, why?
> >
> > I don't understand why we need to change __nf_conntrack_confirm(), can
> > you elaborate?
>
> ok, let's take a step back. The fundamental question I am trying to
> find answer to is that whether it is possible for another thread to
> deallocate and then reallocate and initialize the conntrack object
> while running concurrently during __nf_conntrack_confirm() .
Not unless something is broken.
> crash), we do not have the patch
>
> e53376bef2cd97d3e3f61fdc6
>
> applied. This patch bumps the refcount before adding the connrack
> entry into the unconfirmed list.
Yes, that patch fixes such bug.
> + /* Now it is inserted into the unconfirmed list, bump refcount */
> + nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);
>
> and if we assume the invariant that nf_conntrack_free() is never
> called when refcount is !=0, then this would seem to indicate that the
> above patch should fix the crash I mentioned in the thread.
nf_conntrack_free must only be invoked after refcount becomes zero, right.
> One curious piece of hunk is :
>
> + /* A freed object has refcnt == 0, that's
> + * the golden rule for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU
> + */
> + NF_CT_ASSERT(atomic_read(&ct->ct_general.use) == 0);
> +
> First, this assertion only puts a warning log at best when it fails.
> Second, if this assertion is false, at some point we will get into a
> kernel crash as the one I mentioned. So this assertion effectively
> does nothing other than perhaps help in debugging.
Right.
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