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Message-ID: <CAHmME9pHg7iAorj22DvWKhrH4HXPne7ZBAr7X1wyR7VEkJfk8w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 23:19:06 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@...il.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Is ndo_do_ioctl still acceptable?
On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 9:30 PM, Austin S Hemmelgarn
<ahferroin7@...il.com> wrote:
>>
> On the other hand, based on what you are saying about your device, it sounds
> like you are working on some kind of cryptographically secured (either
> authenticated or encrypted or both) tunnel, in which case the fact that
> security is easier to handle with netlink than ioctls becomes important. If
> you can't ensure security of the endpoint configuration, you can't ensure
> security of the tunnel itself.
Could you substantiate these claims that "security is easier to handle
with netlink". I've never heard this and I don't know why it'd be the
case. Are you referring to the fact that the copy_to/from_user dance
of ioctl opens up more potential vulnerabilities than netlink's
abstracted validation? Or something else? Just confused here...
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