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Message-ID: <20160121173733.GC3452@mrl.redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:37:33 -0200
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
To: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
syzkaller <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: net/sctp: use-after-free in __sctp_connect
On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:18:18PM -0200, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:38:54AM -0500, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> > On 01/15/2016 02:01 PM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:52:31AM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > >> Hello,
> > >>
> > >> The following program causes use-after-free in __sctp_connect:
> > >>
> > > ...
> > >> INFO: Freed in sctp_association_put+0x150/0x250 age=0 cpu=3 pid=15267
> > >> [< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 mm/slub.c:2678
> > >> [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2833
> > >> [< none >] kfree+0x2a8/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:3662
> > >> [< inline >] sctp_association_destroy net/sctp/associola.c:424
> > >> [< none >] sctp_association_put+0x150/0x250 net/sctp/associola.c:860
> > >> [< none >] sctp_wait_for_connect+0x37c/0x4f0 net/sctp/socket.c:7067
> > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >> [< none >] __sctp_connect+0x905/0xb90 net/sctp/socket.c:1215
> > >> [< none >] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x198/0x1d0
> > >> net/sctp/socket.c:1328
> > >> [< inline >] sctp_setsockopt_connectx net/sctp/socket.c:1360
> > >> [< none >] sctp_setsockopt+0x226/0x3630 net/sctp/socket.c:3728
> > >> [< none >] sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2642
> > >> [< inline >] SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1752
> > >> [< none >] SyS_setsockopt+0x158/0x240 net/socket.c:1731
> > >> [< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
> > >> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
> > >
> > > This one may sher some light on that other socket leak one, because the
> > > association shouldn't have been freed at that point.
> > > Now, how it managed to unbalance that refcnt, hmm...
> > >
> >
> > The free may be a result of implicit close when the program ends. If the thread
> > is still waiting for connect to finish when the program ends, we may end up
> > in a situation when the association has been freed, but the ref held by wait_for_connect
> > prevents the destruction. When wait_for_connect finishes in puts the ref and
> > causes the destruction.
>
> That could be it, yes.
>
> > What I am guessing is happing is the wait_for_connect doesn't catch the error condition
> > correctly and thus __sctp_connect() doesn't think there was and error and references
> > the assoc which was just destroyed.
>
> Perfect. There is another thing that this program exploits that, in this
> case, leads to this. It's creating a tcp-style socket, calling connect()
> on it in one thread and sendto() to a different peer in the main thread
> probably while the connect is still in progress. Seems that can lead to
> one having two assocs on a tcp-style socket, because we don't check if
> we the socket has associations but if it's in established state. I don't
> see the checks on sctp_sendmsg() protecting from this case.
>
> 2511 14:55:10 socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SCTP) = 3
> <0.000366>
> 2511 14:55:10 mmap(0x20000000, 65536, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
> MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x20000000 <0.000082>
> 2511 14:55:10 bind(3, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(13280),
> inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=1882116169,
> sin6_scope_id=3305060172}, 28) = 0 <0.000119>
> - bound to IPv6
>
> 2511 14:55:10 mmap(NULL, 8392704, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
> MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_STACK, -1, 0) = 0x7f52f9e75000 <0.000084>
> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0) = 0x1cf8000 <0.000065>
> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0x1d19000) = 0x1d19000 <0.000079>
> 2511 14:55:10 brk(0) = 0x1d19000 <0.000064>
> 2511 14:55:10 mprotect(0x7f52f9e75000, 4096, PROT_NONE) = 0 <0.000091>
> 2511 14:55:10 clone(child_stack=0x7f52fa674ff0,
> flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_FS|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_SYSVSEM|CLONE_SETTLS|CLONE_PARENT_SETTID|CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID,
> parent_tidptr=0x7f52fa6759d0, tls=0x7f52fa675700,
> child_tidptr=0x7f52fa6759d0) = 2512 <0.000211>
> 2511 14:55:10 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, {onoff=6, linger=0},
> 8 <unfinished ...>
> 2512 14:55:10 set_robust_list(0x7f52fa6759e0, 24 <unfinished ...>
> 2511 14:55:10 <... setsockopt resumed> ) = 0 <0.000135>
> 2512 14:55:10 <... set_robust_list resumed> ) = 0 <0.000133>
> 2511 14:55:10 sendfile(3, 3, [0], 192 <unfinished ...>
> 2512 14:55:10 connect(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(13273),
> sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 128 <unfinished ...>
> - connect to IPv4. This connect should timeout, as we can't find a
> route between ipv4/ipv6.
> - no packet is sent due to this
>
> 2511 14:55:10 <... sendfile resumed> ) = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek)
> <0.000146>
> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, [CHLD], [], 8) = 0 <0.000066>
> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigaction(SIGCHLD, NULL, {SIG_DFL, [], 0}, 8) = 0
> <0.000065>
> 2511 14:55:10 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, [], NULL, 8) = 0 <0.000067>
> 2511 14:55:10 nanosleep({4, 0}, 0x7ffffd73eee0) = 0 <4.000258>
> - added a sleep(4) to make this more evident
>
> 2511 14:55:14 sendto(3,
> "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\1\335\1\370\375\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"...,
> 112, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET6, sin6_port=htons(13276), inet_pton(AF_INET6,
> "::1", &sin6_addr), sin6_flowinfo=3512421652, sin6_scope_id=4260889053},
> 128) = 112 <0.001601>
> - sendto() to an IPv6 addr while connect() is still running.
> - socket is not in established state.
> - assoc is not a peeled off, as we can't find a transport using this
> tuple
> - so this new assoc ends up being allowed under a tcp-style socket
> - nobody is listening on 13276. An ABORT is sent back
>
> 2512 14:55:14 <... connect resumed> ) = -1 ECONNREFUSED (Connection
> refused) <4.003595>
> - And suddenly the connect() is confused and thinks the error was for
> it, exact after sendto() auto-association noticed the error.
> - Funny thing is, as sendto() thinks it succeeded, as connect() already
> consumed the error via sctp_error().
>
> If the program was ending and if the threads awakening were the other
> way around, e.g. if connect() had started a bit after sendto(),
> connect() probably would have thought it succeeded, and referenced the
> freed memory.
Hmm connect() doesn't have to start after sendto(), no, as they are
waiting on different wq. Seems it has to wake the connect thread via
sctp_write_space() or sctp_wake_up_waiters(), via sctp_wfree(), which is
set as destructor upon sctp_sendmsg(). So when that chunk is freed, the
connect() returns, seems to make sense to me.
> I'm thinking we should add a function to better identify busy sockets
> such as this. Like in __sctp_connect(), issuing connect()s in parallel
> will also fool current checks. Thoughts?
>
> Marcelo
>
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