netdev - [PATCH net] tcp: fix tcp_mark_head_lost to check skb len before fragmenting

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Date:	Mon, 25 Jan 2016 14:01:53 -0800
From:	Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>
To:	davem@...emloft.net
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>,
	Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] tcp: fix tcp_mark_head_lost to check skb len before fragmenting

From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>

This commit fixes a corner case in tcp_mark_head_lost() which was
causing the WARN_ON(len > skb->len) in tcp_fragment() to fire.

tcp_mark_head_lost() was assuming that if a packet has
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) of N, then it's safe to fragment off a prefix of
M*mss bytes, for any M < N. But with the tricky way TCP pcounts are
maintained, this is not always true.

For example, suppose the sender sends 4 1-byte packets and have the
last 3 packet sacked. It will merge the last 3 packets in the write
queue into an skb with pcount = 3 and len = 3 bytes. If another
recovery happens after a sack reneging event, tcp_mark_head_lost()
may attempt to split the skb assuming it has more than 2*MSS bytes.

This sounds very counterintuitive, but as the commit description for
the related commit c0638c247f55 ("tcp: don't fragment SACKed skbs in
tcp_mark_head_lost()") notes, this is because tcp_shifted_skb()
coalesces adjacent regions of SACKed skbs, and when doing this it
preserves the sum of their packet counts in order to reflect the
real-world dynamics on the wire. The c0638c247f55 commit tried to
avoid problems by not fragmenting SACKed skbs, since SACKed skbs are
where the non-proportionality between pcount and skb->len/mss is known
to be possible. However, that commit did not handle the case where
during a reneging event one of these weird SACKed skbs becomes an
un-SACKed skb, which tcp_mark_head_lost() can then try to fragment.

The fix is to simply mark the entire skb lost when this happens.
This makes the recovery slightly more aggressive in such corner
cases before we detect reordering. But once we detect reordering
this code path is by-passed because FACK is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 0003d40..d2ad433 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -2164,8 +2164,7 @@ static void tcp_mark_head_lost(struct sock *sk, int packets, int mark_head)
 {
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
-	int cnt, oldcnt;
-	int err;
+	int cnt, oldcnt, lost;
 	unsigned int mss;
 	/* Use SACK to deduce losses of new sequences sent during recovery */
 	const u32 loss_high = tcp_is_sack(tp) ?  tp->snd_nxt : tp->high_seq;
@@ -2205,9 +2204,10 @@ static void tcp_mark_head_lost(struct sock *sk, int packets, int mark_head)
 				break;

 			mss = tcp_skb_mss(skb);
-			err = tcp_fragment(sk, skb, (packets - oldcnt) * mss,
-					   mss, GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (err < 0)
+			/* If needed, chop off the prefix to mark as lost. */
+			lost = (packets - oldcnt) * mss;
+			if (lost < skb->len &&
+			    tcp_fragment(sk, skb, lost, mss, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
 				break;
 			cnt = packets;
 		}
-- 
2.7.0.rc3.207.g0ac5344