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Message-ID: <1459951424.5425.12.camel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 06 Apr 2016 16:03:44 +0200
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] selinux: avoid nf hooks overhead when not needed
On Wed, 2016-04-06 at 08:33 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 5:51 AM, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com> wrote:
> > Currently, selinux always registers iptables POSTROUTING hooks regarless of
> > the running policy needs for any action to be performed by them.
> >
> > Even the socket_sock_rcv_skb() is always registered, but it can result in a no-op
> > depending on the current policy configuration.
> >
> > The above invocations in the kernel datapath are cause of measurable
> > overhead in networking performance test.
> >
> > This patch series adds explicit notification for netlabel status change
> > (other relevant status change, like xfrm and secmark, are already notified to
> > LSM) and use this information in selinux to register the above hooks only when
> > the current status makes them relevant, deregistering them when no-op
> >
> > Avoiding the LSM hooks overhead, in netperf UDP_STREAM test with small packets,
> > gives about 5% performance improvement on rx and about 8% on tx.
>
> [NOTE: added the SELinux mailing list to the CC line, please include
> when submitting SELinux patches]
>
> While I appreciate the patch and the work that went into development
> and testing, I'm going to reject this patch on the grounds that it
> conflicts with work we've just started thinking about which should
> bring some tangible security benefit.
>
> The recent addition of post-init read only memory opens up some
> interesting possibilities for SELinux and LSMs in general, the thing
> which we've just started looking at is marking the LSM hook structure
> read only after init. There are some complicating factors for
> SELinux, but I'm confident those can be resolved, and from what I can
> tell marking the hooks read only will have no effect on other LSMs.
> While marking the LSM hook structure doesn't directly affect the
> SELinux netfilter hooks, once we remove the ability to deregister the
> LSM hooks we will have no need to support deregistering netfilter
> hooks and I expect we will drop that functionality as well to help
> decrease the risk of tampering.
What if we drops the selinux hook related changes in the second patch
(the on-demand socket_sock_rcv_skb() [de-]registration)?
The patch will not conflict with the LSM hook structure becoming
read-only, we still retain the ability of registering/de-registering the
netfilter hooks, and that will still affect positively the tx network
performance.
Regards,
Paolo
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