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Message-ID: <CALx6S37F3_SGRH24CrjT8Raot9oPb-LpJ-fU7HGnHUAPL5KUPg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 10:05:57 -0700
From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Cc: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@...cle.com>,
Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>
Subject: Re: IPv6 extension header privileges
On Fri, May 27, 2016 at 9:46 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@...essinduktion.org> wrote:
> On Thu, May 26, 2016, at 20:42, Tom Herbert wrote:
>> Thinking about this some more, the per option white list is a better
>> approach. If we allow an open ended mechanism for applications to
>> signal the network with arbitrary data (like user specified hbp
>> options would be), then use of that mechanism will inevitably
>> exploited by some authorities to force user to hand over private data
>> about their communications. It's better to not build in back doors to
>> security...
>
> Also I don't think that HbH options form some kind of hidden covert
> channel. They mostly appear by unused fields which cannot be verified by
> the other (receiving) side in any way.
It would be pretty easy to make it that. All a network operator would
need to do is strip their proprietary options on egress from their
network. So a receiver, say our servers at FB, would have no way to
determine that our clients are being manipulated.
Tom
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