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Message-ID: <87wplkihbp.fsf@tassilo.jf.intel.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2016 22:02:02 -0700
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Shanker Wang <shanker@...a.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>,
Guillaume Nault <g.nault@...halink.fr>,
Miao Wang <shankerwangmiao@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net:ppp: replace too strict capability restriction on opening /dev/ppp
Shanker Wang <shanker@...a.tsinghua.edu.cn> writes:
> This patch removes the check for CAP_NET_ADMIN in the initial namespace
> when opening /dev/open. Instead, CAP_NET_ADMIN is checked in the user
> namespace the net namespace was created so that /dev/ppp cat get opened
> in a unprivileged container.
Seems dangerous. From a quick look at the PPP ioctl there is no limit
how many PPP devices this can create. So a container having access to
this would be able to fill all kernel memory. Probably needs more
auditing and hardening first.
In general there seems to be a lot of attack surface for root
in PPP.
-Andi
--
ak@...ux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only
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