netdev - Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] userns: sysctl limits for namespaces

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Message-Id: <1469194399.3817016.673814953.7581706C@webmail.messagingengine.com>
Date:	Fri, 22 Jul 2016 09:33:19 -0400
From:	Colin Walters <walters@...bum.org>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Nikolay Borisov <kernel@...p.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] userns: sysctl limits for namespaces

On Thu, Jul 21, 2016, at 12:39 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> 
> This patchset addresses two use cases:
> - Implement a sane upper bound on the number of namespaces.
> - Provide a way for sandboxes to limit the attack surface from
>   namespaces.

Perhaps this is obvious, but since you didn't quite explicitly state it;
do you see this as obsoleting the existing downstream patches
mentioned in:
https://lwn.net/Articles/673597/
It seems conceptually similar to Kees' original approach, right?

The high level makes sense to me...most interesting is
per-userns sysctls.  I'll note most current container managers
mount /proc/sys read-only, and Docker specifically drops
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE by default, so they'd likely need to learn
how to undo that if one wanted to support recursive container usage.
We'd probably need to evaluate the safety of having /proc/sys
writable generally.  (Also it's rather common to filter out CLONE_NEWUSER
via seccomp, but that's easy to undo)

But that's the flip side - if we're aiming primarily for an upstreamable
way to *limit* namespace usage, it seems sane to me.