netdev - Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sat, 27 Aug 2016 00:40:14 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc:     "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
>
> The first RFC [1] was focused on extending seccomp while staying at the syscall
> level. This brought a working PoC but with some (mitigated) ToCToU race
> conditions due to the seccomp ptrace hole (now fixed) and the non-atomic
> syscall argument evaluation (hence the LSM hooks).
>
>
> # Landlock LSM
>
> This second RFC is a fresh revamp of the code while keeping some working ideas.
> This series is mainly focused on LSM hooks, while keeping the possibility to
> tied them to syscalls. This new code removes all race conditions by design. It
> now use eBPF instead of a subset of cBPF (as used by seccomp-bpf). This allow
> to remove the previous stacked cBPF hack to do complex access checks thanks to
> dedicated eBPF functions. An eBPF program is still very limited (i.e. can only
> call a whitelist of functions) and can not do a denial of service (i.e. no
> loop). The other major improvement is the replacement of the previous custom
> checker groups of syscall arguments with a new dedicated eBPF map to collect
> and compare Landlock handles with system resources (e.g. files or network
> connections).
>
> The approach taken is to add the minimum amount of code while still allowing
> the userland to create quite complex access rules. A dedicated security policy
> language such as used by SELinux, AppArmor and other major LSMs is a lot of
> code and dedicated to a trusted process (i.e. root/administrator).
>

I think there might be a problem with the current design.  If I add a
seccomp filter that uses RET_LANDLOCK and some landlock filters, what
happens if a second seccomp filter *also* uses RET_LANDLOCK?  I think
they'll interfere with each other.  It might end up being necessary to
require only one landlock seccomp layer at a time or to find a way to
stick all the filters in a layer together with the LSM callbacks or
maybe to just drop RET_LANDLOCK and let the callbacks look at the
syscall args.

BTW, what happens if an LSM hook is called outside a syscall context,
e.g. from a page fault?

>
>
> # Sandbox example with conditional access control depending on cgroup
>
>   $ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed
>   $ ls /home
>   user1
>   $ LANDLOCK_CGROUPS='/sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed' \
>       LANDLOCK_ALLOWED='/bin:/lib:/usr:/tmp:/proc/self/fd/0' \
>       ./sandbox /bin/sh -i
>   $ ls /home
>   user1
>   $ echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/sandboxed/cgroup.procs
>   $ ls /home
>   ls: cannot open directory '/home': Permission denied
>

Something occurs to me that isn't strictly relevant to landlock but
may be relevant to unprivileged cgroups: can you cause trouble by
setting up a nastily-configured cgroup and running a setuid program in
it?