Message-ID: <57C2B21E.9040705@digikod.net>
Date:   Sun, 28 Aug 2016 11:42:54 +0200
From:   Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@...r.kernel.org>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups (performance)



On 28/08/2016 10:13, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Aug 27, 2016 11:14 PM, "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27/08/2016 22:43, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 09:35:14PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>> On 27/08/2016 20:06, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 04:06:38PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>>> As said above, Landlock will not run an eBPF programs when not strictly
>>>>>> needed. Attaching to a cgroup will have the same performance impact as
>>>>>> attaching to a process hierarchy.
>>>>>
>>>>> Having a prog per cgroup per lsm_hook is the only scalable way I
>>>>> could come up with. If you see another way, please propose.
>>>>> current->seccomp.landlock_prog is not the answer.
>>>>
>>>> Hum, I don't see the difference from a performance point of view between
>>>> a cgroup-based or a process hierarchy-based system.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe a better option should be to use an array of pointers with N
>>>> entries, one for each supported hook, instead of a unique pointer list?
>>>
>>> yes, clearly array dereference is faster than link list walk.
>>> Now the question is where to keep this prog_array[num_lsm_hooks] ?
>>> Since we cannot keep it inside task_struct, we have to allocate it.
>>> Every time the task is creted then. What to do on the fork? That
>>> will require changes all over. Then the obvious optimization would be
>>> to share this allocated array of prog pointers across multiple tasks...
>>> and little by little this new facility will look like cgroup.
>>> Hence the suggestion to put this array into cgroup from the start.
>>
>> I see your point :)
>>
>>>
>>>> Anyway, being able to attach an LSM hook program to a cgroup thanks to
>>>> the new BPF_PROG_ATTACH seems a good idea (while keeping the possibility
>>>> to use a process hierarchy). The downside will be to handle an LSM hook
>>>> program which is not triggered by a seccomp-filter, but this should be
>>>> needed anyway to handle interruptions.
>>>
>>> what do you mean 'not triggered by seccomp' ?
>>> You're not suggesting that this lsm has to enable seccomp to be functional?
>>> imo that's non starter due to overhead.
>>
>> Yes, for now, it is triggered by a new seccomp filter return value
>> RET_LANDLOCK, which can take a 16-bit value called cookie. This must not
>> be needed but could be useful to bind a seccomp filter security policy
>> with a Landlock one. Waiting for Kees's point of view…
>>
> 
> I'm not Kees, but I'd be okay with that.  I still think that doing
> this by process hierarchy a la seccomp will be easier to use and to
> understand (which is quite important for this kind of work) than doing
> it by cgroup.
> 
> A feature I've wanted to add for a while is to have an fd that
> represents a seccomp layer, the idea being that you would set up your
> seccomp layer (with syscall filter, landlock hooks, etc) and then you
> would have a syscall to install that layer.  Then an unprivileged
> sandbox manager could set up its layer and still be able to inject new
> processes into it later on, no cgroups needed.

A nice thing I didn't highlight about Landlock is that a process can
prepare a layer of rules (arraymap of handles + Landlock programs) and
pass the file descriptors of the Landlock programs to another process.
This process could then apply this programs to get sandboxed. However,
for now, because a Landlock program is only triggered by a seccomp
filter (which do not follow the Landlock programs as a FD), they will be
useless.

The FD referring to an arraymap of handles can also be used to update a
map and change the behavior of a Landlock program. A master process can
then add or remove restrictions to another process hierarchy on the fly.

However, I think it would make more sense to use cgroups if we want to
move an existing (unwilling) unsandoxed process into a sandboxed
environment. Of course, some more no_new_privs checks would be needed.



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