Message-ID: <20160830042459.GC25396@ircssh.c.rugged-nimbus-611.internal>
Date:   Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:25:00 -0700
From:   Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>
Cc:     Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        cgroups@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, mic@...ikod.net
Subject: Re: [net-next RFC v2 4/9] bpf, security: Add Checmate security LSM
 and BPF program type

On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 02:49:17PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On 8/29/16 12:24 PM, Tejun Heo wrote:
> >Hello, Sargun.
> >
> >On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 11:49:07AM -0700, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> >>It would be a separate hook per LSM hook. Why wouldn't we want a separate bpf
> >>hook per lsm hook? I think if one program has to handle them all, the first
> >>program would be looking up the hook program in a bpf prog array. If you think
> >>it's better to have this logic in the BPF program, that makes sense.
> >>
> >>I had a version of this patch that allowed you to attach a prog array instead,
> >>but I think that it's cleaner attaching a program per lsm hook. In addition,
> >>there's a performance impact that comes from these hooks, so I wouldn't want to
> >>execute unneccessary code if it's avoidable.
> >
> >Hmm... it doesn't really matter how the backend part looks like and if
> >we need to implement per-call hooks to lower runtime overhead, sure.
> >I was mostly worried about the approach propagating through the
> >userland visible interface.
> >
> >>The prog array approach also makes stacking filters difficult. If people want
> >>multiple filters per hook, the orchestrator would have to rewrite the existing
> >>filters to be cooperative.
> >
> >I'm not really sure "stacking" in the kernel side is a good idea.
> >Please see below.
> >
> >>>I'm not convinced about the approach.  It's an approach which pretty
> >>>much requires future extensions while being rigid.  Not a good
> >>>combination.
> >>
> >>Do you have an alternative recommendation? Maybe just a set of 5 u64s
> >>as the context object along with the hook ID?
> >
> >cgroup fs doesn't seem like the right interface for this but if it
> >were I'd go for named hook IDs instead of opaque numbers.
> >
> >>>Unless this is properly delegatable, IOW, it's safe to fully delegate
> >>>to a lesser security domain for all operations including program
> >>>loading and assignment (I can't see how that'd be the case), making it
> >>>an explicit controller doens't work in terms of userland interface.
> >>>It's fine for bpf / lsm / whatever to attach to cgroups by extending
> >>>struct cgroup itself or implementing an implicit controller but to be
> >>>visible as an explicit controller it must be able to follow cgroup
> >>>interface rules including delegation.  If not, it's best to come
> >>>through the interface which enforces the required permission checks
> >>>and then talk to cgroup from there.  This was also an issue with
> >>>network cgroup bpf programs that Daniel Mack is working on.  Please
> >>>chat with him.
> >>
> >>Program assignment is possible by lesser security domains. Program loading is
> >>limited to CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns. We could make it accessible to
> >>CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any userns, but it the reasoning behind this is that Checmate
> >>BPF programs can leak kernel pointers.
> >
> >That doesn't make much sense to me.  Delegation doesn't mean much if a
> >delegatee can't load its own program (and I don't see how one can
> >delegate kernel pointer access to !root).  Also, unless there's
> >per-program fine control on who can load it, it seems pretty dangerous
> >to let anyone load any program.
> >
> >>Could we potentially restrict it to only CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, while still meeting
> >>cgroup delegation requirements?
> >
> >Wouldn't it make far more sense to pass cgroup fd to bpf syscall so
> >that "load this program" and "attach this program to the cgroup
> >identified by this fd" through the same interface and permission
> >checks?  cgroup participating in bpf operations is all fine but
> >splitting the userland interface across two domains seems like a bad
> >idea.
> >
> >>Filters which are higher up in the heirarchy will still be enforced during
> >>delegation. This was an explicit design, as the "Orchestrator in Orchestrator"
> >>use case needs to be supported.
> >
> >Given that program loading is restricted to root, wouldn't it be an a
> >lot more efficient approach to let userland multiplex multiple
> >programs?  Walking the tree executing bpf programs each time one of
> >these operations runs can be pretty expensive.  Imagine a tree like
> >the following.
> >
> >	A - B - C
> >	      \ D
> >
> >Let's say program is currently loaded on D.  If someone wants to add a
> >program on B, userland can load the program on B, combine B's and D's
> >program and compile them into a single program and load it on D.  The
> >only thing kernel would need to do in terms of hierarchy is finding
> >what's the closest program to execute.  In the above example, C would
> >need to use B's program and that can be determined on program
> >assignment time rather than on each operation.
> 
> I think that's exactly what Daniel's patches are doing and imo
> it makes sense to keep this style for lsm as well
> and also apply the concept of hook_id.
> Daniel adds two commands to bpf syscall to attach/detach from cgroup
> with hook_id.
I have a couple outstanding question about Daniel's patches, but overall, I 
think the approach works just as well. I've asked him these questions on that 
thread.

> Initially two hooks will be for socket rx and tx.
> Then all interesting lsm hooks can be added one by one.
> Daniel's prog type will be bpf_prog_type_cgroup_socket_filter.
> LSM's prog type will be bpf_prog_type_lsm.
> And verifier can check type safety since the lsm hook_id will be
> passed at the program load time.
> See another thread we had with Mickael.
I read that thread, but I'm not entirely sure as to the reasoning behind the 
verifier needing further analysis of the programs, at least in MVP. 
bpf_probe_read / bpf_probe_(kernel_)write seem to be reasonable as a starter, 
and then we can modify the verifier to allow for direct access to those fields.

I also realize that the verifier can be used to prevent pointers leakage, but 
with my work, since it's meant to only be accessible to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, I'm not 
really worried about that.
> 
> landlock and checmate are very similar and should really be
> single lsm as long as we agree that both are cgroup based.
> The main difference between the two:
> - landlock is proposing unpriveleged mode
> - checmate is proposing writing into arguments from the program
> These differences can be flags/options to one lsm.
> Implementations of course are different so far, but
> instead of arguing landlock vs checmate, I'd like us
> to focus on how we can make one lsm that solves all use cases.
> 
I think it probably makes sense to be able to mark a specific program an 
unprivileged, and then the verifier can make sure it's safe. My fear with this, 
and the approach that Daniel's patches have is that the unprivileged isolators 
could interfere with privigleged isolators.

What's the permission model by which unprivileged programs will be able to load 
programs, and attach them to cgroups?

Powered by blists - more mailing lists