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Message-ID: <20160926175827.GA54376@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 10:58:28 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 04:49:17PM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 09/24/2016 08:01 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF
> >program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if
> >is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it
> >with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is
> >then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF
> >programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments.
> >
> >Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or
> >PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as
> >privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for
> >socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
> >However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs
> >which could use pointers in their context.
> >
> >Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> >Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
> >Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
>
> Seems okay to me:
>
> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Mickael, please mention [PATCH net-next] in subject next time.
Thanks
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