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Message-ID: <58078CE5.50200@iogearbox.net>
Date:   Wed, 19 Oct 2016 17:10:29 +0200
From:   Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To:     Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
CC:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        cgroups@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()

On 10/19/2016 04:54 PM, Thomas Graf wrote:
> On 09/14/16 at 09:23am, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> This fix a pointer leak when an unprivileged eBPF program read a pointer
>> value from the context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer
>> type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register
>> value containing an address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this
>> prevented unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate)
>> pointer arguments.
>>
>> This bug was not a problem until now because the only unprivileged eBPF
>> program allowed is of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER and all the types
>> from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
>> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")
>> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
>
> Can you post this fix separately? It's valid and needed outside of the
> scope of this series.

Yes, that one was already merged:

https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=1955351da41caa1dbf4139191358fed84909d64b

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