netdev - Re: [PATCH net-next 3/4] bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel encapsulation

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Date:   Mon, 31 Oct 2016 18:35:00 +0100
From:   Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>
To:     Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
Cc:     "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        roopa <roopa@...ulusnetworks.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 3/4] bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel
 encapsulation

On 10/31/16 at 09:07am, Tom Herbert wrote:
> I guess this leads to a more general question I have about the effects
> of allowing userspace to insert code in the kernel that modifies
> packets. If we allow BPF programs to arbitrarily modify packets in
> LWT, how do we ensure that there are no insidious effects later in the
> path? For instance,  what someone uses BPF to convert an IPv6 packet
> to IPv4, or maybe convert packet to something that isn't even IP, or
> what if someone just decides to overwrite every byte in a packet with
> 0xff?

This is why modifying packets is not allowed on input at all as it
would invalidate the IP parsing that has already been done.

Writing is allowed for dst_output() on the basis that it is the
equivalent of a raw socket with header inclusion. If you look at
rawv6_send_hdrinc(), it does not perform any validation and calls into
dst_output() directly. I agree though that this must be made water
proof.

Pushing additional headers is only allowed at xmit, this is the
equivalent LWT MPLS.

> Are these thing allowed, and if so what is the effect? I would
> assume a policy that these can't cause any insidious effects to
> unrelated traffic or the rest of the system, in particular such things
> should not cause the  kernel to crash (based on the principle that
> user space code should never cause kernel to crash). I think XDP might

Agreed. Although it's already possible to hook a kernel module at LWT
or Netfilter to do arbitrary packet modifications, BPF must be held
at a higher standard even in privileged mode.