netdev - [PATCH net V2] net/sched: pedit: make sure that offset is valid

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Message-Id: <20161128105640.32363-1-amir@vadai.me>
Date:   Mon, 28 Nov 2016 12:56:40 +0200
From:   Amir Vadai <amir@...ai.me>
To:     "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
        Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>,
        Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@...lanox.com>,
        Hadar Har-Zion <hadarh@...lanox.com>,
        Jiri Pirko <jiri@...lanox.com>, Amir Vadai <amir@...ai.me>
Subject: [PATCH net V2] net/sched: pedit: make sure that offset is valid

Add a validation function to make sure offset is valid:
1. Not below skb head (could happen when offset is negative).
2. Validate both 'offset' and 'at'.

Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <amir@...ai.me>
---
Hi Dave,

Please pull to -stable branches.

Changes from V0:
- Add a validation to the 'at' value (this is used as an offset too)
- Instead of validating the output of skb_header_pointer(), make sure that the
	offset is good before calling it.

Thanks,
Amir
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index b54d56d4959b..cf9b2fe8eac6 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -108,6 +108,17 @@ static void tcf_pedit_cleanup(struct tc_action *a, int bind)
 	kfree(keys);
 }
 
+static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
+{
+	if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len)
+		return false;
+
+	if  (offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static int tcf_pedit(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 		     struct tcf_result *res)
 {
@@ -134,6 +145,11 @@ static int tcf_pedit(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			if (tkey->offmask) {
 				char *d, _d;
 
+				if (!offset_valid(skb, off + tkey->at)) {
+					pr_info("tc filter pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
+						off + tkey->at);
+					goto bad;
+				}
 				d = skb_header_pointer(skb, off + tkey->at, 1,
 						       &_d);
 				if (!d)
@@ -146,10 +162,10 @@ static int tcf_pedit(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 					" offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
 				goto bad;
 			}
-			if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len) {
-				pr_info("tc filter pedit"
-					" offset %d can't exceed pkt length %d\n",
-				       offset, skb->len);
+
+			if (!offset_valid(skb, off + offset)) {
+				pr_info("tc filter pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
+					offset);
 				goto bad;
 			}
 
-- 
2.10.2