Message-ID: <20161231041111.GD2448@templeofstupid.com>
Date:   Fri, 30 Dec 2016 20:11:11 -0800
From:   Krister Johansen <kjlx@...pleofstupid.com>
To:     "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Introduce a sysctl that modifies the value of PROT_SOCK.

Add net.ipv4.ip_unprotected_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl
that denotes the first unprotected inet port in the namespace.  To
disable all protected ports set this to zero.  It also checks for
overlap with the local port range.  The protected and local range may
not overlap.

The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind
to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify
their container's network configuration.  The latter is accomplished by
ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user
namespace.  This modification was needed to allow the container manager
to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing
control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace.

Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@...pleofstupid.com>
---
 include/net/ip.h               | 12 +++++++++
 include/net/netns/ipv4.h       |  3 +++
 net/Kconfig                    |  7 +++++
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c             |  5 +++-
 net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c     | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c            |  3 ++-
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c |  7 +++--
 net/sctp/socket.c              | 10 ++++---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |  3 ++-
 9 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/ip.h b/include/net/ip.h
index ab6761a..65f1375 100644
--- a/include/net/ip.h
+++ b/include/net/ip.h
@@ -270,6 +270,18 @@ static inline int inet_is_local_reserved_port(struct net *net, int port)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+static inline int inet_prot_sock(struct net *net)
+{
+	return net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
+}
+#else
+static inline int inet_prot_sock(struct net *net)
+{
+	return PROT_SOCK;
+}
+#endif
+
 __be32 inet_current_timestamp(void);
 
 /* From inetpeer.c */
diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
index 8e3f5b6..f1126686 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/ipv4.h
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ struct netns_ipv4 {
 	/* Shall we try to damage output packets if routing dev changes? */
 	int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
 	int sysctl_ip_early_demux;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+	int sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
+#endif
 
 	int sysctl_fwmark_reflect;
 	int sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept;
diff --git a/net/Kconfig b/net/Kconfig
index a100500..946999c 100644
--- a/net/Kconfig
+++ b/net/Kconfig
@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ config NETWORK_PHY_TIMESTAMPING
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+	bool "Adjust reserved port range via sysctl"
+	depends on SYSCTL
+	help
+	  This allows the administrator to adjust the reserved port range
+	  using a sysctl.
+
 menuconfig NETFILTER
 	bool "Network packet filtering framework (Netfilter)"
 	---help---
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index aae410b..c44ea78 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
 	err = -EACCES;
-	if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1700,6 +1700,9 @@ static __net_init int inet_init_net(struct net *net)
 	net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl = IPDEFTTL;
 	net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr = 0;
 	net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+	net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = PROT_SOCK;
+#endif
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index 134d8e1..2167e3f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
 static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
 static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
 static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+static int ip_protected_port_min;
+static int ip_protected_port_max = 65535;
+#endif
 static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
 static int ip_ttl_max = 255;
 static int tcp_syn_retries_min = 1;
@@ -79,7 +83,17 @@ static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
 	if (write && ret == 0) {
+		/* Ensure that the upper limit is not smaller than the lower,
+		 * and that the lower does not encroach upon the protected
+		 * port limit.
+		 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+		if ((range[1] < range[0]) ||
+		    (range[0] < net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock))
+#else
+
 		if (range[1] < range[0])
+#endif
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 		else
 			set_local_port_range(net, range);
@@ -88,6 +102,42 @@ static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
+static int ipv4_protected_ports(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
+	    ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
+	int ret;
+	int pports;
+	int range[2];
+	struct ctl_table tmp = {
+		.data = &pports,
+		.maxlen = sizeof(pports),
+		.mode = table->mode,
+		.extra1 = &ip_protected_port_min,
+		.extra2 = &ip_protected_port_max,
+	};
+
+	pports = net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
+
+	ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+	if (write && ret == 0) {
+		inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
+		/* Ensure that the local port range doesn't overlap with the
+		 * protected port range.
+		 */
+		if (range[0] < pports)
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = pports;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
 
 static void inet_get_ping_group_range_table(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t *low, kgid_t *high)
 {
@@ -971,6 +1021,15 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = {
 		.extra2		= &one,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOWPORT_SYSCTL
+	{
+		.procname	= "ip_unprotected_port_start",
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.data		= &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock,
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= ipv4_protected_ports,
+	},
+#endif
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index aa42123..04db406 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
-	if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index 55e0169..8b7416f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -426,10 +426,9 @@ ip_vs_service_find(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, __u32 fwmark, __u16 protocol
 	 */
 	svc = __ip_vs_service_find(ipvs, af, protocol, vaddr, vport);
 
-	if (svc == NULL
-	    && protocol == IPPROTO_TCP
-	    && atomic_read(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter)
-	    && (vport == FTPDATA || ntohs(vport) >= PROT_SOCK)) {
+	if (!svc && protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
+	    atomic_read(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter) &&
+	    (vport == FTPDATA || ntohs(vport) >= inet_prot_sock(ipvs->net))) {
 		/*
 		 * Check if ftp service entry exists, the packet
 		 * might belong to FTP data connections.
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 318c678..2723f4a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+	if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
@@ -1152,8 +1152,10 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk,
 				 * accept new associations, but it SHOULD NOT
 				 * be permitted to open new associations.
 				 */
-				if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
-				    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
+				if (ep->base.bind_addr.port <
+				    inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+				    !ns_capable(net->user_ns,
+				    CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
 					err = -EACCES;
 					goto out_free;
 				}
@@ -1818,7 +1820,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
 			 * but it SHOULD NOT be permitted to open new
 			 * associations.
 			 */
-			if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
+			if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
 			    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
 				err = -EACCES;
 				goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c7c6619..53cb6da 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4365,7 +4365,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 
 			inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
 
-			if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
+			if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
+			    snum > high) {
 				err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
 						      snum, &sid);
 				if (err)
-- 
2.7.4

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