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Message-ID: <CAF=yD-+GGAdvgXoZeMshyQXXh_3m9kjDGNFf9FQ43rxJgk__vw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 15:51:54 -0500
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@...cle.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC net-next] packet: always ensure that we pass
hard_header_len bytes in skb_headlen() to the driver
On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Sowmini Varadhan
<sowmini.varadhan@...cle.com> wrote:
> On (01/27/17 14:29), Willem de Bruijn wrote:
>>
>> As your patch state, the contract is that any packet delivered to a
>> driver has the entire L2 in its linear section. Drivers are not required
>> to be robust against shorter packets, so there is no reason to test
>> those.
>>
>> One option is to limit your fix to known fixed-header protocols.
>> In these cases hard_header_len is the minimum, so anything
>> smaller must be dropped.
>
> yes, but how would you you know that this is a fixed-header protocol
> or a var-hdrlen protocol? AIUI the hard_header_len itself will not
> tell you this info: it will be 77 for ax25, 14 for ethernet,
> but that does not tell me that ax25 is the "robust-er" driver
> with a min requirement of 21 for the hdrlen.
Right. Identifying the outliers is the hard part.
> That's why I was thinking of a IFF_L2_VARHDRLEN in the priv_flags
> of the net_device.
>
>> For protocols with variable header length it is fine to send packets
>> shorter than hard_header_len, even with corrupted content (i.e.,
>> even if they would fail that protocol's validate callback), as long as
>> they exceed the minimum length. ax25 already has a min length
>> check through its protocol-specific validate callback.
>
> Another option that comes to mind.. the real thorn-in-the-flesh
> here is the CAP_SYS_RAWIO check. Would it be a better idea to ask
> the test-suites (since they seem to be the major consumer of
> that path) to use a special PF_PACKET socket option instead, that
Introducing a sysctl has the same effect. It is not possible to
identify all callers dependent on the current ABI.
I see these options
- make capable() check conditional on sysctl (or interface flag, ..)
- limit capable() check to drivers with with .validate callback
- hardcode a list of known fixed length protocols that must fail
- let privileged applications shoot themselves in the foot (change nothing).
The first will break tests. Though with a runtime fix: flip the flag.
The second will break variable length header protocols unless
you exhaustively search for all variable length protocols and add
validate callbacks first.
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