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Message-ID: <CAPAsAGx4UoUv3tyef56Dfvo7bfinY-hUHhUeDTGWbCxsw72Bqw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 17:58:44 +0300
From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
nikolay@...ulusnetworks.com, nicolas.dichtel@...nd.com,
adobriyan@...il.com,
linux-wireless <linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: KASAN+netlink, was: [PATCH] [net-next?] hns: avoid stack overflow
with CONFIG_KASAN
2017-02-08 16:10 GMT+03:00 Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>:
> On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net> wrote:
>
>> Btw, what's causing this to start with? Can't the compiler reuse the
>> stack places?
>
> I have no idea. It's trying to find out of bounds accesses for
> objects on the stack, so maybe it gives each variable a separate
> stack location in order to see which one caused problems?
>
If compiler cannot prove that access to the local variable is valid it
will add redzones around that variable
to be able to detect out of bounds accesses.
For example:
static inline int nla_put_u8(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u8 value)
{
return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u8), &value);
}
compiler will surround 'value' with redzones to catch potential oob
access in nla_put().
Another way to fix this, would be something like this:
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
/* don't bloat stack */
#define __noinline_for_kasan __noinline __maybe_unused
#else
#define __noinline_for_kasan inline
#endif
static __noinline_for_kasan int nla_put_u8(struct sk_buff *skb, int
attrtype, u8 value)
{
return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u8), &value);
}
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