netdev - Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/8] xdp: Infrastructure to generalize XDP

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Message-ID: <CALx6S37_GOP4a0x2aVbde1ynZRxDXx3A+YfY6sMMEZQEKN_1+g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 9 Feb 2017 18:29:54 -0800
From:   Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
To:     David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/8] xdp: Infrastructure to generalize XDP

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 5:42 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
> From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
> Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:45:04 -0800
>
>> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 2:34 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
>>> From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
>>> Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 14:26:50 -0800
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 2:17 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
>>>>> From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
>>>>> Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 15:41:20 -0800
>>>>>
>>>>>> These hooks are also generic to allow for XDP/BPF programs as well
>>>>>> as non-BPF code (e.g. kernel code can be written in a module).
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't think we should even remotely consider surrendering the XDP
>>>>> hook to module code.
>>>>>
>>>>> We restrict it to eBPF for a reason, because that framework is
>>>>> restricted in what it can do, what it can access, and how it can do
>>>>> so.
>>>>>
>>>> Kernel modules go through extensive netdev review before they are
>>>> taken into the kernel, for BPF programs we just allow what any user
>>>> gives us without any peer review even implied.
>>>
>>> We can actually control what externally written XDP eBPF programs can
>>> do, for kernel modules we have no such control or influence.  This
>>> hook runs right in the driver and bypasses the entire stack, it has to
>>> execute in a hardened thing that cannot crash and it will not as long
>>> as BPF verifier is correct.
>>>
>>> And you're going to make it even more complicated what XDP offload in
>>> hardware actually means.  With eBPF it is very clearly defined what
>>> the necessary execution engine is.
>>>
>>> Tom I'm strongly against being allowed to run arbitrary module code
>>> from the XDP hook, sorry.
>>>
>>> It is as important as the distinction between full stack offload and
>>> partial offload in those nice charts in your talks. :-)
>>>
>> Yes it is. And the relevant principle that I would draw from that is
>> the "offload" means offloading functionality from the kernel **to**
>> the device. Restricting what we implement in the kernel on the basis
>> of whether or not it can be offloaded to a device is completely
>> backwards in this regard.
>
> I didn't say that's the reason I'm against it.
>
> I said it's because eBPF is constrained, and there is a very
> well understood universe of operations it can perform and what
> memory it can access.
>
> Whereas modules can touch any piece of kernel memory, loop, crash,
> deadlock, you name it.  None of which is possible with eBPF.

So we have thousands or LOC coming into drivers every day anyway with
all those properties anyway, so this "restricted" environment solves
at best 1% of the problem.


I must admit though that "loops" in code is now considered to be evil
at the same level as deadlocks and crashes is amusing :-)

Tom