lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Tue, 28 Feb 2017 13:06:49 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <>
To:     Willem de Bruijn <>
Cc:     Michael Kerrisk <>,
        netdev <>,
        Willem de Bruijn <>,
        Linux API <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] socket sendmsg MSG_ZEROCOPY

On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Willem de Bruijn
<> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 2:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski <> wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Michael Kerrisk
>> <> wrote:
>>> [CC +=]
>>> Hi Willem
>>>> On a send call with MSG_ZEROCOPY, the kernel pins the user pages and
>>>> creates skbuff fragments directly from these pages. On tx completion,
>>>> it notifies the socket owner that it is safe to modify memory by
>>>> queuing a completion notification onto the socket error queue.
>> What happens if the user writes to the pages while it's not safe?
>> How about if you're writing to an interface or a route that has crypto
>> involved and a malicious user can make the data change in the middle
>> of a crypto operation, thus perhaps leaking the entire key?  (I
>> wouldn't be at all surprised if a lot of provably secure AEAD
>> constructions are entirely compromised if an attacker can get the
>> ciphertext and tag computed from a message that changed during the
>> computation.
> Operations that read or write payload, such as this crypto example,
> but also ebpf in tc or iptables, for instance, demand a deep copy using
> skb_copy_ubufs before the operation.
> This blacklist approach requires caution, but these paths should be
> few and countable. It is not possible to predict at the socket layer
> whether a packet will encounter any such operation, so white-listing
> a subset of end-to-end paths is not practical.

How about hardware that malfunctions if the packet changes out from
under it?  A whitelist seems quite a bit safer.


Powered by blists - more mailing lists