Message-ID: <db8cbaea-d4e5-3123-0b14-857737b753bc@digikod.net>
Date:   Thu, 2 Mar 2017 00:28:14 +0100
From:   Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 06/10] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per
 process hierarchy



On 01/03/2017 23:20, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 1, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>
>> On 28/02/2017 21:01, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>> The seccomp(2) syscall can be use to apply a Landlock rule to the
>>>> current process. As with a seccomp filter, the Landlock rule is enforced
>>>> for all its future children. An inherited rule tree can be updated
>>>> (append-only) by the owner of inherited Landlock nodes (e.g. a parent
>>>> process that create a new rule)
>>>
>>> Can you clarify exaclty what this type of update does?  Is it
>>> something that should be supported by normal seccomp rules as well?
>>
>> There is two main structures involved here: struct landlock_node and
>> struct landlock_rule, both defined in include/linux/landlock.h [02/10].
>>
>> Let's take an example with seccomp filter and then Landlock:
>> * seccomp filter: Process P1 creates and applies a seccomp filter F1 to
>> itself. Then it forks and creates a child P2, which inherits P1's
>> filters, hence F1. Now, if P1 add a new seccomp filter F2 to itself, P2
>> *won't get it*. The P2's filter list will still only contains F1 but not
>> F2. If P2 sets up and applies a new filter F3 to itself, its filter list
>> will contains F1 and F3.
>> * Landlock: Process P1 creates and applies a Landlock rule R1 to itself.
>> Underneath the kernel creates a new node N1 dedicated to P1, which
>> contains all its rules. Then P1 forks and creates a child P2, which
>> inherits P1's rules, hence R1. Underneath P2 inherited N1. Now, if P1
>> add a new Landlock rule R2 to itself, P2 *will get it* as well (because
>> R2 is part of N1). If P2 creates and applies a new rule R3 to itself,
>> its rules will contains R1, R2 and R3. Underneath the kernel created a
>> new node N2 for P2, which only contains R3 but inherits/links to N1.
>>
>> This design makes it possible for a process to add more constraints to
>> its children on the fly. I think it is a good feature to have and a
>> safer default inheritance mechanism, but it could be guarded by an
>> option flag if we want both mechanism to be available. The same design
>> could be used by seccomp filter too.
>>
> 
> Then let's do it right.
> 
> Currently each task has an array of seccomp filter layers.  When a
> task forks, the child inherits the layers.  All the layers are
> presently immutable.  With Landlock, a layer can logically be a
> syscall fitler layer or a Landlock layer.  This fits in to the
> existing model just fine.
> 
> If we want to have an interface to allow modification of an existing
> layer, let's make it so that, when a layer is added, you have to
> specify a flag to make the layer modifiable (by current, presumably,
> although I can imagine other policies down the road).  Then have a
> separate API that modifies a layer.
> 
> IOW, I think your patch is bad for three reasons, all fixable:
> 
> 1. The default is wrong.  A layer should be immutable to avoid an easy
> attack in which you try to sandbox *yourself* and then you just modify
> the layer to weaken it.

This is not possible, there is only an operation for now:
SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE. You can only add more rules to the list (as
for seccomp filter). There is no way to weaken a sandbox. The question
is: how do we want to handle the rules *tree* (from the kernel point of
view)?

> 
> 2. The API that adds a layer should be different from the API that
> modifies a layer.

Right, but it doesn't apply now because we can only add rules.

> 
> 3. The whole modification mechanism should be a separate patch to be
> reviewed on its own merits.

For a rule *replacement*, sure!

> 
>> The current inheritance mechanism doesn't enable to only add a rule to
>> the current process. The rule will be inherited by its children
>> (starting from the children created after the first applied rule). An
>> option flag NEW_RULE_HIERARCHY (or maybe another seccomp operation)
>> could enable to create a new node for the current process, and then
>> makes it not inherited by the previous children.
> 
> I like my proposal above much better.  "Add a layer" and "change a
> layer" should be different operations.

I agree, but for now it's about how to handle immutable (but growing)
inherited rules.



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