netdev - Re: [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] socket sendmsg MSG

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Message-ID: <CAF=yD-L76wJhxVgG6CDYmQFfWYkUyK7QCWt_Jue_Tdh4hHVLgA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 28 Feb 2017 19:58:39 -0500
From:   Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To:     Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
Cc:     Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] socket sendmsg MSG_ZEROCOPY

On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 7:28 PM, Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 3:22 PM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 2017-02-28 at 14:52 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>>> The user pages are a gift to the kernel.  The application  may  not
>>> modify this memory ever, otherwise the page cache and on-disk data may
>>> differ.
>>>
>>> This is just not okay IMO.
>>
>> TCP works just fine in this case.
>>
>> TX checksum will be computed by the NIC after/while data is copied.
>>
>> If really the application changes the data, that will not cause any
>> problems, other than user side consistency.
>>
>> This is why we require a copy (for all buffers that came from zero-copy)
>> if network stack hits a device that can not offload TX checksum.
>>
>> Even pwrite() does not guarantee consistency if multiple threads are
>> using it on overlapping regions.
>>
> The Mellanox team working on TLS offload pointed out to us that if
> data is changed for a retransmit then it becomes trivial for someone
> snooping to break the encryption. Sounds pretty scary and it would be
> a shame if we couldn't use zero-copy in that use case :-( Hopefully we
> can find a solution...
>

This requires collusion by the process initiating the zerocopy send
to help the entity snooping the link. That could be an attack on admin
configured tunnels, but user-directed encryption offload like AF_TLS
can still use zerocopy.