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Message-ID: <CALx6S357ssnbEu7CMrczEjiX25QYBJh3WG=w8KuAoxGQS4aKLA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 16:28:51 -0800
From: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] socket sendmsg MSG_ZEROCOPY
On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 3:22 PM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-02-28 at 14:52 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>> The user pages are a gift to the kernel. The application may not
>> modify this memory ever, otherwise the page cache and on-disk data may
>> differ.
>>
>> This is just not okay IMO.
>
> TCP works just fine in this case.
>
> TX checksum will be computed by the NIC after/while data is copied.
>
> If really the application changes the data, that will not cause any
> problems, other than user side consistency.
>
> This is why we require a copy (for all buffers that came from zero-copy)
> if network stack hits a device that can not offload TX checksum.
>
> Even pwrite() does not guarantee consistency if multiple threads are
> using it on overlapping regions.
>
The Mellanox team working on TLS offload pointed out to us that if
data is changed for a retransmit then it becomes trivial for someone
snooping to break the encryption. Sounds pretty scary and it would be
a shame if we couldn't use zero-copy in that use case :-( Hopefully we
can find a solution...
Tom
>
>
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