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Message-ID: <fae7c3d4-5143-6f66-9551-a26d7db7de51@stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 20:03:53 +0200
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, aviadye@...lanox.com
Cc: ilyal@...lanox.com, borisp@...lanox.com, davejwatson@...com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, matanb@...lanox.com, liranl@...lanox.com,
haggaie@...lanox.com, tom@...bertland.com,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, nmav@...lts.org,
fridolin.pokorny@...il.com, ilant@...lanox.com,
kliteyn@...lanox.com, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
saeedm@...lanox.com, aviadye@....mellanox.co.il
Subject: Re: [RFC TLS Offload Support 00/15] cover letter
Hello,
On 29.03.2017 19:41, David Miller wrote:
> From: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@...lanox.com>
> Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:26:17 +0300
>
>> TLS Tx crypto offload is a new feature of network devices. It
>> enables the kernel TLS socket to skip encryption and authentication
>> operations on the transmit side of the data path, delegating those
>> to the NIC. In turn, the NIC encrypts packets that belong to an
>> offloaded TLS socket on the fly. The NIC does not modify any packet
>> headers. It expects to receive fully framed TCP packets with TLS
>> records as payload. The NIC replaces plaintext with ciphertext and
>> fills the authentication tag. The NIC does not hold any state beyond
>> the context needed to encrypt the next expected packet,
>> i.e. expected TCP sequence number and crypto state.
>
> It seems like, since you do the TLS framing in TCP and the card is
> expecting to fill in certain aspects, there is a requirement that the
> packet contents aren't mangled between the TLS framing code and when
> the SKB hits the card.
>
> Is this right?
>
> For example, what happens if netfilter splits a TLS Tx offloaded frame
> into two TCP segments?
Furthermore, it doesn't seem to work with bonding or any other virtual
interface, which could move the skb's to be processed on another NIC, as
the context is put onto the NIC. Even a redirect can not be processed
anymore (seems like those patches try to stick the connection to an
interface anyway).
Wouldn't it be possible to keep the state in software and push down a
security context per skb, which get applied during sending? If not
possible via hw, slowpath can encrypt packet in sw.
Also sticking connections to outgoing interfaces might work for TX, but
you can't force the interface where packets come in.
Bye,
Hannes
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