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Message-ID: <59010B5A.6060509@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2017 23:04:26 +0200
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
CC: ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.com, jbenc@...hat.com,
aconole@...heb.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 4/6] bpf: track if the bpf program was loaded
with SYS_ADMIN capabilities
On 04/26/2017 08:24 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Ahh, looks this got swapped with 3/6.
> ---
> include/linux/filter.h | 6 ++++--
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 +++-
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 7 ++++---
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++--
> net/core/filter.c | 6 +++---
> 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
> index 63624c619e371b..635311f57bf24f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/filter.h
> +++ b/include/linux/filter.h
> @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ struct bpf_prog {
> locked:1, /* Program image locked? */
> gpl_compatible:1, /* Is filter GPL compatible? */
> cb_access:1, /* Is control block accessed? */
> - dst_needed:1; /* Do we need dst entry? */
> + dst_needed:1, /* Do we need dst entry? */
> + priv_cap_sys_admin:1; /* Where we loaded as sys_admin? */
> kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta);
> enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */
[...]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 6f8b6ed690be93..24c9dac374770f 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -3488,7 +3488,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
> if (ret < 0)
> goto skip_full_check;
>
> - env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + env->allow_ptr_leaks = env->prog->priv_cap_sys_admin;
>
> ret = do_check(env);
>
> @@ -3589,7 +3589,7 @@ int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
> if (ret < 0)
> goto skip_full_check;
>
> - env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + env->allow_ptr_leaks = prog->priv_cap_sys_admin;
>
> ret = do_check(env);
>
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 9a37860a80fc78..dc020d40bb770a 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ int bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **pfp, struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog)
> if (!bpf_check_basics_ok(fprog->filter, fprog->len))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - fp = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(fprog->len), 0);
> + fp = bpf_prog_alloc(bpf_prog_size(fprog->len), 0, false);
> if (!fp)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
Did you check that transferring allow_ptr_leaks doesn't have a side
effect on the nfp JIT? I believe it can also do cbpf migrations to
a certain extend.
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