[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20170509135009.13751-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 15:50:04 +0200
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
davem@...emloft.net, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 0/5] skb_to_sgvec hardening
The recent bug with macsec and historical one with virtio have
indicated that letting skb_to_sgvec trounce all over an sglist
without checking the length is probably a bad idea. And it's not
necessary either: an sglist already explicitly marks its last
item, and the initialization functions are diligent in doing so.
Thus there's a clear way of avoiding future overflows.
So, this patchset, from a high level, makes skb_to_sgvec return
a potential error code, and then adjusts all callers to check
for the error code. There are two situations in which skb_to_sgvec
might return such an error:
1) When the passed in sglist is too small; and
2) When the passed in skbuff is too deeply nested.
So, the first patch in this series handles the issues with
skb_to_sgvec directly, and the remaining ones then handle the call
sites.
Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
skbuff: return -EMSGSIZE in skb_to_sgvec to prevent overflow
ipsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
rxrpc: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
macsec: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
virtio_net: check return value of skb_to_sgvec always
drivers/net/macsec.c | 13 ++++++++--
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 ++-
net/core/skbuff.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
net/ipv4/ah4.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 30 ++++++++++++++--------
net/ipv6/ah6.c | 8 ++++--
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 31 +++++++++++++++--------
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 13 +++++++---
8 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
--
2.12.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists