netdev - Re: [PATCH] kmod: don't load module unless req process has CAP_SYS

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Message-ID: <CAF2d9jjdouSQYVk3kbWyOUEUe5b8S_Q6_Zx2WE_EBZB1cVeEvA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 15 May 2017 10:59:55 -0700
From:   Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) 
        <maheshb@...gle.com>
To:     David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:     gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
        mahesh@...dewar.net, mingo@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, keescook@...omium.org,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kmod: don't load module unless req process has CAP_SYS_MODULE

On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 6:52 AM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 08:10:59 +0200
>
>> On Sun, May 14, 2017 at 08:57:34AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> writes:
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
>>> index bcb0f610ee42..6b72528a4636 100644
>>> --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
>>> +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
>>> @@ -2595,7 +2595,7 @@ static int rtnl_newlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
>>>
>>>                 if (!ops) {
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
>>> -                       if (kind[0]) {
>>> +                       if (kind[0] && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
>>>                                 __rtnl_unlock();
>>>                                 request_module("rtnl-link-%s", kind);
>>>                                 rtnl_lock();
>>
>> I don't object to this if the networking developers don't mind the
>> change in functionality.  They can handle the fallout :)
>
> As I've said in another email, I am pretty sure this can break things.

The current behavior is already breaking things. e.g. unprivileged
process can be root inside it's own user-ns. This will allow it to
create IPtable rules causing contracking module to be loaded in
default-ns affecting every flow on the server (not just the namespace
that user or an unprivileged process is attached to). Cases that I
mentioned above are just the tip of an iceberg.

In a non-namespace world this wouldn't happen as capability checks are
performed correctly but the moment an unprivileged user can create
it's own user-ns and becomes root inside, it could make use of these
things and perform privileged operations in default-ns. So to protect
"global namespace" from making such things happen, we have to protect
using global capability check.

Alternatively we can preserve the existing behavior by adding this
check for non-default-user-ns only. e.g.

diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index 6e67315ec368..263f0d175091 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -2595,7 +2595,9 @@ static int rtnl_newlink(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct nlmsghdr *nlh,

                if (!ops) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
-                       if (kind[0]) {
+                       if (kind[0] &&
+                           ((net->user_ns == &init_user_ns) ||
+                            capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))) {
                                __rtnl_unlock();
                                request_module("rtnl-link-%s", kind);
                                rtnl_lock();

if we have to do this in net-subsystem then it's not just this call
site and there are lot more. But if this is an acceptable alternative,
I can think of better implementation for all those sites.