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Message-ID: <20170630193544.GM9307@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 21:35:44 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>, fw@...len.de,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>, kaber@...sh.net,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> wrote:
> Hi!
>
> I noticed that nf_conntrack leaks kernel addresses, it uses the memory address
> as identifier used for generating conntrack and expect ids..
> Since these ids are also visible to unprivileged users via network namespaces
> I suggest reverting these commits:
Why not use a hash of the address?
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