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Message-ID: <20170701094443.GA1527@salvia>
Date: Sat, 1 Jul 2017 11:44:43 +0200
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>, kaber@...sh.net,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID
On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 10:23:24PM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Florian,
>
> Am 30.06.2017 um 21:55 schrieb Florian Westphal:
> >>> Why not use a hash of the address?
> >>
> >> Would also work. Or xor it with a random number.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, for user space it would be more useful when the conntrack id
> >> does not repeat that often. That's why I favor the good old counter method.
> >> Currently the conntrack id is reused very fast.
> >> e.g. in one of our applications we use the conntack id via NFQUEUE and watch the
> >> destroy events via conntrack. It happens regularly that a new connection has the
> >> same id than a different connection we saw some moments before, before we receive
> >> the destroy event from the conntrack socket.
> >
> > Perhaps we can place that in a new extension (its not needed in any
> > fastpath ops)?
>
> To get rid of the infoleak we have to re-introduce the id field in struct nf_conn
> and struct nf_conntrack_expect.
> Otherwise have nothing to compare against in the conntrack/expect remove case.
>
> So the only question is what to store, IMHO a counter that can wrap around is the
> cheapest method and would also not harm the fast-path.
I have a patch to assign ids through percpu approach that I can
recover. It's dividing the u64 id space between the existing num_cpus.
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