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Message-ID: <48b0c119-5277-1eca-d5d6-f2539ad3a7e8@android.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 11:07:53 -0700
From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
To: Andrew Lunn <andrew@...n.ch>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: refcount_t + (resend to wider audience)
On 07/28/2017 10:41 AM, Andrew Lunn wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 10:15:23AM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
>> (Resend to wider audience to comply with
>> Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.txt)
>>
>> Please apply/backport the following upstream feature and followup
>> grouped fixes patches to the stable trees (expect included in at least
>> 3.10.y, 3.18.y, 4.4.y and 4.9.y):
> .. _stable_kernel_rules:
>
> Hi Mark
>
> Everything you ever wanted to know about Linux -stable releases
> ===============================================================
>
> Rules on what kind of patches are accepted, and which ones are not, into the
> "-stable" tree:
>
> - It must be obviously correct and tested.
> - It cannot be bigger than 100 lines, with context.
>
> The first patch you list is 342 lines. The second one is 634.
>
> Please could you read the rules and then provide some justification
> for ignoring many of the rules.
>
> Andrew
The first four patches add a new dependent upstream API and type,
refcount_t. New APIs will notoriously cause a large number of lines to
be adjusted. They are complete (ToT will/should match stable),
orthogonal, and without CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL completely inert in all
places where atomic_t reference counters used, and are replaced with
refcount_t in the followup patches that take advantage of this new type.
The first four do _nothing_ at all to the kernel as-is, but represent a
dependency for the following changes.
The remaining patches (for the most part) take advantage of this new API
to mostly fix, or report/warn when they can not, Use-After-Free (KASAN)
bugs which can lead to root attack exploits. atomic_t are subject to
unbounded attacks, refcount_t are relatively immune to unbounded
attacks. It is admittedly not a complete fix, but greatly reduce the
chances of the security issues. The recommendation is to turn on
CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, but that is a decision to balance between security
and performance.
For any platform that requires the latest security updates, refcount_t
is going to be a requirement. I urge you to overlook the first four
patch sizes because of their status as an orthogonal type and API,
necessary dependency for security improvements.
Sincerely -- Mark Salyzyn
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