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Message-Id: <20170812120510.28750-41-phil@nwl.cc>
Date: Sat, 12 Aug 2017 14:04:59 +0200
From: Phil Sutter <phil@....cc>
To: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [iproute PATCH 40/51] tc/m_xt: Fix for potential string buffer overflows
- Use strncpy() when writing to target->t->u.user.name and make sure the
final byte remains untouched (xtables_calloc() set it to zero).
- 'tname' length sanitization was completely wrong: If it's length
exceeded the 16 bytes available in 'k', passing a length value of 16
to strncpy() would overwrite the previously NULL'ed 'k[15]'. Also, the
sanitization has to happen if 'tname' is exactly 16 bytes long as
well.
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@....cc>
---
tc/m_xt.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tc/m_xt.c b/tc/m_xt.c
index ad52d239caf61..9218b14594403 100644
--- a/tc/m_xt.c
+++ b/tc/m_xt.c
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ build_st(struct xtables_target *target, struct xt_entry_target *t)
if (t == NULL) {
target->t = xtables_calloc(1, size);
target->t->u.target_size = size;
- strcpy(target->t->u.user.name, target->name);
+ strncpy(target->t->u.user.name, target->name,
+ sizeof(target->t->u.user.name) - 1);
target->t->u.user.revision = target->revision;
if (target->init != NULL)
@@ -277,8 +278,8 @@ static int parse_ipt(struct action_util *a, int *argc_p,
}
fprintf(stdout, " index %d\n", index);
- if (strlen(tname) > 16) {
- size = 16;
+ if (strlen(tname) >= 16) {
+ size = 15;
k[15] = 0;
} else {
size = 1 + strlen(tname);
--
2.13.1
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