netdev - [PATCH net] sctp: potential read out of bounds in sctp_ulpevent_type

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Date:   Wed, 13 Sep 2017 12:20:28 +0300
From:   Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To:     Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Cc:     Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] sctp: potential read out of bounds in
 sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled()

This code causes a static checker warning because Smatch doesn't trust
anything that comes from skb->data.  I've reviewed this code and I do
think skb->data can be controlled by the user here.

The sctp_event_subscribe struct has 13 __u8 fields and we want to see
if ours is non-zero.  sn_type can be any value in the 0-USHRT_MAX range.
We're subtracting SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE which is 1 << 15 so we could read
either before the start of the struct or after the end.

This is a very old bug and it's surprising that it would go undetected
for so long but my theory is that it just doesn't have a big impact so
it would be hard to notice.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
---
I'm not terribly familiar with sctp and this is a static checker fix.
Please review it carefully.

diff --git a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
index 1060494ac230..e6873176bea7 100644
--- a/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/ulpevent.h
@@ -154,7 +154,11 @@ static inline int sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled(__u16 sn_type,
 					     struct sctp_event_subscribe *mask)
 {
 	char *amask = (char *) mask;
-	return amask[sn_type - SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE];
+	int offset = sn_type - SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE;
+
+	if (offset >= sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe))
+		return 0;
+	return amask[offset];
 }

 /* Given an event subscription, is this event enabled? */